

1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF THE ST
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAT
3	By: S Smisko
4	THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
5	Plaintiff,) PV300
6	vs.) No. CR 2008-1339
7	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,
8	Defendant.)
9	
10	
11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
12	DIVISION SIX YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA
13	
14	PRESCOTT, ARIZONA TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2009
15	8:57 A.M.
16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
17	HEARING ON MOTIONS
18	ALLOCUTION BY CHARLOTT AND KATHERINE DEMOCKER
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	ROXANNE E. TARN, CR Certified Court Reporter
25	Certificate No. 50808

1 NOVEMBER 17, 2009 8:57 A.M. HEARING ON MOTIONS 4 APPEARANCES: FOR THE STATE, MR. JOE BUTNER. 5 FOR THE DEFENDANT, MR. JOHN SEARS, MR. LARRY HAMMOND, AND MS. ANN CHAPMAN. FOR CHARLOTT AND KATHERINE DEMOCKER, MR. CHRIS DUPONT. 7 This is State versus Steven 8 THE COURT: 9 Carroll DeMocker, CR 2008-1339. Mr. DeMocker is present and 10 is in custody with Mr. Sears representing him. 11 Mr. DeMocker's other counsel are also present. Mr. Butner is 12 here for the State. 13 We are set for hearing of various motions 14 that have been filed. The first one that I would like to 15 take up is Chris Dupont filed a request for the Court to allow the DeMocker children to allocute with regard to the 16 17 release motion that I still have under advisement. Is Mr. Dupont here? 18 MR. DUPONT: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Good morning. Sorry I didn't 20 21 recognize you. 22 Did you have one that was here? Are both 23 here? 24 MR. DUPONT: Your Honor, Charlott is here, and 25 Katherine is available by phone. I think I filed a separate

request that she be allowed to allocute telephonically.

THE COURT: I don't have a problem with that, but do you have a number? And I am not sure to what extent our clerk can set that up.

MR. DUPONT: I did get here a little early. I think that we can set it up on that. If it is not audible, she said we can just put a microphone on it. We do have a telephone number.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't really think it is reopening anything or re-examining anything. I have the matter under advisement still from the hearing that we had on September 22nd. I don't recall if Charlott was there or not, but she is welcome to speak at this time.

MR. DUPONT: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. CHARLOTT DEMOCKER: Good morning, Your Honor. I am Charlott DeMocker.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. CHARLOTT DEMOCKER: It is difficult to remember a time in my life when I have not felt protected, sheltered from the countless dangers of growing up. In 16 years of living in the same small town, I never once questioned the safety of my own home or where I sleep at night.

While it is impossible to grasp the number of changes the last year has forever meant to my life,

I can pinpoint almost instantly the cause of my constant unease. For as long as I can remember, my father was there to save me from the various perils of childhood. Every time I scraped my knees climbing up to our treehouse or bruised my elbow falling off our prized trampoline, my father was there to lift me off the ground and hold me in his arms until I felt invincible again.

I had an ideal childhood, but not because of the dolls I played with or the things in my backyard. With every year that I grew, my mother and father together inspired a truly unparalleled love of the world and everything it contained. With such a solid, gallant presence in my life, I felt it was impossible for me to fail.

It is not unfair to say that my family came upon hard times. With a long separation and an impending divorce, there was noticeable strain on every family member. But I will never forget the hundreds of hours that I spent talking to my dad about how much he loved my mother and how much he longed for a way to fix it all. That is just who he is.

My father, my dad is the most compassionate, supportive, brilliant man I know. I like to think that because of my close relationship with him, I know him better than most who could speak here today. And if there is one thing I just know, it is that my father is not

capable of what he is accused of.

I was taught from a young age that all life is sacred. So it is inconceivable that my dad, who would not even kill spiders when I was young, but would instead catch and release them, would be incapable of harming not only another human being, but the woman he loved for 25 years. I am certain of my father's innocence and of his nonviolent nature.

But for 390 days, he has been in jail, punished constantly with no solid reason. It's not only his current living conditions that are cruel, but it is also the staggering loss that was suffered on July 2nd, 2008. His arrest shortly afterwards has made it nearly impossible to view the loss that has shaken my family to its very core.

The tragic loss of my mom was acutely painful, but the added loss of my dad was and is unbearable. For 13 months I have not touched or hugged my dad. Among others things, he missed his daughters's birthdays, a Christmas, and the first anniversary of my mother's untimely death. If he is further delayed in coming home, he will be absent for both my sister's graduation from college and my own graduation from high school.

I need my father. And I ask today that he be allowed to return home to soothe the deep pain of both of his daughters.

1	THE COURT: Thank you.
2	Do you want to make arrangements with the
3	clerk?
4	MR. DUPONT: You are on speaker phone now.
5	Can you hear me all right?
6	MS. KATHERINE DEMOCKER: Yes.
7	THE COURT: Would you tell us your name,
8	first, of all, please.
9	MS. KATHERINE DEMOCKER: My name is Katherine
10	DeMocker.
11	THE COURT: Miss DeMocker, if you would please
12	speak in the tone that you have just been speaking in. You
13	are being reported by the court reporter, and she obviously
14	needs to be able to write down what you are saying.
15	But you are welcome to begin and let me
16	know your thoughts.
17	MS. KATHERINE DEMOCKER: All right. Is my
18	sister there? Has she already spoken?
19	THE COURT: She has already spoken.
20	MS. KATHERINE DEMOCKER: All right.
21	Well, first of all, thank you very much
22	for giving my sister the opportunity to voice our thoughts
23	and feelings on this issue. Let me apologize in advance.
24	I'm a little bit sick, so if you have trouble hearing me,
25	just stop me and let me know.

I am sure my sister has already articulated our desire is to have our father be able to come home and await trial and while still being able to kind of serve as our father, a role that he does very well and has been very missed in. There is no way for me to cover all the reasons that I believe this should happen, which range from personal to evidentiary or in my limited knowledge, lack thereof. However, there are particular areas I would like to touch on to give you a picture of who I believe my father is, what he means to us, and why it is so important that he come home, and also why we believe he could never do such a thing as he is being accused of.

While it is a clear to me that my parents grew apart over the years, which is not uncommon, they were two of the best parents I could ever ask for growing up. We are a ridiculously close family. We slept in the same bed or at least in the same room for years when Charlott and I were young.

They agreed on almost all parenting decisions, including the fact that they both hated violence so much that despite the fact that I was a stubborn terror of a child sometimes, they didn't believe in spanking. I remember the last time I ever got spanked it -- I was just being so crazy in the back of a car. I was very, very little, and I think my mom decided to spank me, and it

affected her and my dad so much that they decided from then on I would only be given time outs. That is just one example of ways that I -- I mean, I've never seen my parents really, or my dad, be violent towards my family or my mom or anyone, really.

During the years of their separation, it was very clear that they were becoming slightly different people, but it was also obvious that there were still parts of them that loved each other very much and respected who the other person was, which is probably why it took them over six years of going back and forth on whether or not to get a divorce before they finally did it. The divorce was, in the end, I believe, probably the right decision. Charlott and I were tired of hearing them go back and forth, and the divorce was probably the best way to help them kind of both move on with their lives and be happy again.

As I am sure you know and read, they squabbled about money and little things like that, but in my opinion and experience watching far nastier divorces of my friends' parents, the things that they talked about were very normal for kind of divorce -- people who were getting a divorce. To my knowledge, there were never serious threats of any kind or people feeling scared. It was more just kind of frustration and anger over little things.

After the divorce was finalized, I saw

both of my parents kind of feeling relieved. They had a few minor transactions to finish up, from what I recall, but I don't know, things were being taken care of and planned around, and everybody was kind of doing what needed to be done to move on.

Not a month after the divorce, both of them agreed to come to the airport with me to see me off to where I was supposed to be studying abroad in South Africa. The half-hour at the airport I spent saying good-bye to my family is absolutely one of the most precious moments I hold onto -- not only because it was the last time I saw my mom alive, but because each of us there kind of expressed nothing but love and appreciation for the family that the four of us had created.

And the divorce didn't really destroy this family that were all there together, even if the dynamics had changed, and I think everyone there was really just trying to express that. There were tears and smiles and kind of embraces between everyone. And I obviously can't convey, like, how I felt during that moment, but -- I mean, as I walked down the airport terminal, I looked back and I saw my dad with his arm around my mom and my sister, like all waving good-bye to me. And that was, I think, maybe four days before my mom was killed.

So to my knowledge, facts and evidence,

not emotions, convict people in court. But from what I have been told, this case currently rests on motive and a lack of an alibi. And to me, the emotion and the person that my dad is is far more convincing evidence than that is at this moment.

And my dad -- I mean, to give you some idea of who he is to my sister and I, my dad became my best friend in the last four years. He is the one I would call while I was walking home from class if -- you know, if I was upset with social dynamics at school, he would be the person I would talk to. Boys, school -- he would wake up at 5:00 a.m. or earlier, sometimes to edit my paper that I had finished the night before, just because he loved being our dad. He liked being there and being part of our lives.

And I think that that is able -- he is being very, very missing -- not just for me, but for somebody probably even who needs him more, which is my little sister, who is spending a lot of time now trying to prepare herself to apply to college, which is one of the most stressful things that I remember doing. And, you know, we have a great support system, a large family who have all chipped in and been very helpful -- and Rene, who has given up a lot of things to help take care of my sister and be there. But I don't think anyone can really replace a parent, especially in such discombobulated circumstances that are currently taking

place.

So I think that that is really having an effect. Every time I talk to Charlott, you know, there are different areas of confusion and instability in her life that I think there is just no replacement for an adequate parent. And there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that my dad is that parent. He has been for 22 years of my life, and I have never once questioned him.

I guess -- I guess I don't -- I don't know how to express exactly why it is I feel it's so important for him to await this at home, because in the end, I believe that, you know, he will come home to us. But I think that even in this interim period between now and whenever this trial fully takes place, I think it is important for him to be there for my sister, for myself. And because he has spent the last -- over a year in jail, awaiting -- waiting for this thing to happen with, you know -- I am not privy to all of the information, but limited, limited evidence.

I don't believe he could ever do what he is being accused of. I have never seen him be violent. You know, the most he would ever do is yell at me when I was being -- when I was being the very stubborn child that I definitely had the tendency to do sometimes. He believed in non-violence, would take us all on camping trips. He was a

vegetarian for the first ten, twelve years of my life with my mom and sister and I. And, I don't know, he is a good person. He is strong and would do pretty much anything for his family, and I have never seen him question that.

So I really appreciate you taking the time to hear us out on this, and if there is any way -- if there is any way that this can have any effect, I would really please ask that you let my dad come home on whatever circumstances or conditions of release that you feel fit, but it would mean a lot to us, and I am sure to him to be able to spend the next few months waiting for this trial with his family. We miss him very much.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. KATHERINE DEMOCKER: Thank you.

MR. DUPONT: And Your Honor, thank you very much for allowing Katherine and Charlott to say a few words about their father. I know that it's very --

THE COURT: Not at all. I think it's required by the rules, as you correctly pointed out.

MR. DUPONT: It's required, and I think it's just so important for you to know from the people who knew him best what a good man he is, what a good father he was, his life-long commitment to non-violence, and that he's a person that really takes his responsibility to his family and his daughters seriously. And we all believe that he takes

his responsibilities to the Court seriously, too. And he's spent a lot of time and resources to make sure that this gets done right.

You know, as I became familiar with this case, and by happenstance I was here in town on unrelated matters during the time of the arrest, and during the time when you initially remanded this -- or invalidated the first grand jury proceedings, I remember just having the sense of wonder about the lack of evidence in this case and why the State wasn't pursuing these other potential suspects and like -- and I don't know all the facts -- the neighbor in the yard -- or the neighbor who ended up killing himself.

That really turned to bewilderment when I had a chance to meet and speak with Charlott and Katherine and learn what a good man he is, what a good relationship he had with them, and what a good relationship he had with his wife that extended to when -- to after the divorce, too. That this was still a functioning family unit after the divorce, and they did have a good relationship.

My bewilderment turned to shock when I learned about the initial appearance. And I think you have seen that transcript now, where the prosecution and the judge basically ruled that Charlott and Katherine would have to waive their victims' rights to continue any relationship with their father.

THE COURT: I thought that was a misinterpretation of the law.

THE COURT:

MR. DUPONT: I think so, too. And we have made some progress in rectifying that at this point.

And I know that Miss Chapman is going to be talking a little bit later about victim's rights -- a little bit later today. I would like to take a minute to voice our joinder in certain sections of that motion, while we are here, if that's all right with you, Judge.

Thank you. That was distracting. Go

MR. DUPONT: Thank you, Your Honor.

Miss DeMocker?

She is gone.

Again, dealing with the shock, I think we have all come to the understanding that loving your father and wanting contact with him is not a violation of the Victim's Rights Act. You don't need to waive your status as a victim to continue a relationship with your father, and it is certainly not a reason to cut Charlott and Katherine out of the process.

And that is why we really want to join, in particular, in Sections 1, 2 and 4 of Miss Chapman's motion. We do believe there is a conflict that comes into clear focus, particularly in this case when we do have the initial ruling from the judge that they need to waive their

victim's rights in order to speak to their father.

So early on, they felt they had to waive the right to be advised of hearings, to meet and confer with the prosecutor, and to speak in court. But the problem continues, because the victim's rights statutes say that even if you take victim's rights and want the contact and the judge approves it, that the prosecutor has some kind of right by the Victim's Right Act to control the correspondence between the defense attorneys and Charlott and Katherine. They have a right to control the contact and even to tape-record their conversations. That's wrong, Judge.

And we think that it's set out, all the legal reasons that it's the wrong in Miss Chapman's motion. So what's happened in this case is that they waived their right to victim's rights, which limited their ability to get information about the case. And then with the prosecutor by statute being allowed to limit the contact with the defense attorneys, that further limited their ability to get information about the case. It just left them --

THE COURT: It didn't, because they waived.

MR. DUPONT: But the Victim's Rights Act say that the prosecution is then still interjected between the --

THE COURT: Whether it says that or not, that is not a point in fact what has been happening, is it, to be

realistic?

MR. DUPONT: No, Judge, it's not. We have been receiving some information, but the statute itself is the problem. So that while we have taken some measure -- and I've spoken with Mr. Butner recently. He's assured me that they will be allowed to exercise their victim's rights and confer and get information and voice their opinions in court and to the prosecutor. That hasn't all happened yet, but we think factually we are going to deal with some of the stuff. But that doesn't correct the problem with the law itself.

And that's why we think it's still important for us to join in those sections of the motion.

And in particular, one of the problems that still persists is that their grandmother on their mother's side, who was a person that was very close to them, that relationship has become strained, and part of it has to do with the way the victim's rights process has played out.

We think that if you rightly invalidate those sections of the Victim's Right Act, the defense could be a tremendous resource in providing that information to their grandmother about the lack of evidence, about the failure to pursue other suspects who may still be out there, that they can be a real unifying force in this and help to reunify the family.

So that is why, on behalf of Charlott and

1 Katherine, we are asking that you declare those sections 2 unconstitutional and that you release their father. 3 from everything you have heard that he is a good man and a 4 good father who takes his responsibility very seriously. 5 will have his opportunity to prove his innocence. 6 From now until then, that is all time 7 And that is important time for Katherine and for 8 This bond between the father and a daughter is 9 sacred. It's been -- it's not right to interfere with that, as the judge did at the initial appearance. And we are 10 asking that you set some conditions of bond that will allow 11 12 him to be out and to be reunited with his daughters. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. The matter remains 14 under advisement, as I took it under advisement previously. 15 Any particular order in which you want to 16 address the various motions between the two sides? 17 MR. BUTNER: Judge, before we move past that, 18 I did file -- it's sort of a response to what Mr. Dupont has 19 put before the Court, and I gave it to the clerk this morning. And in essence, if I might just respond a little 20 21 bit orally at this point in time? 22 Is that different from what you THE COURT: 23 filed? 24 MR. BUTNER: Yes. Somewhat. 25 THE COURT: Go ahead.

2 =

MR. DUPONT: Your Honor, may I just interject?

And the reason is because -- and I got this response this

morning. But I understand that contact between any victims'

representatives at the prosecutor's office and Charlott and

Katherine is supposed to be privileged. I did notice that

Mr. Butner attached it to his pleading.

THE COURT: Is there a reference in what was filed to that?

MR. DUPONT: It is an attachment, notes of the conversations with the girls. So I just want either the exhibit or the entire pleading sealed. And if Mr. Butner is free to respond, but not in a way that would violate that privilege between the victims' representatives and Charlott and Katherine.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I don't know that that is privileged if it has been opened by the victims and their attorneys saying that they have been incorrectly advised by the prosecution in this case. Seems to me that they have said that, "Hey, the prosecutor is telling us the wrong thing in this case or their victim services people are, and so we haven't had our opportunity to be heard," and that is just not the truth.

THE COURT: Well, in all honesty, the -- that doesn't have any bearing on my decision on the release issue

as to whether they are or were misadvised or are misadvised.

I don't think they are misadvised now. So frankly, it's not going to play an effect in my decision on the matter.

MR. BUTNER: Well, I am glad to hear that,

Judge, but I would like to set the record straight, and I did

do that by filing a copy of the e-mail transmissions that

took place early on in this case right after the defendant's

arrest.

THE COURT: Are the portions that you filed the representations made or the information provided by your side, meaning the Victim's Service Unit?

MR. BUTNER: Correct.

THE COURT: Or it is information provided by the girls's to Victim's Service.

MR. BUTNER: Actually, it's both, Judge. It is conversations directed by e-mail to the Victim's Services Unit, and then it is responses from Victim Services to them basically saying, quite frankly, that they certainly have the right to be heard concerning release, and it has nothing to do with their opting in or opting out with Victim Services.

THE COURT: It seems to me that the matters provided by your staff to the victims are not privileged material, in the sense of it being responsive to the claims that were made. So I will redact any comments made by the girls to Victim Services, and if you could submit a redacted

version of that, as far as what information was provided by the County Attorney's Office, to make a complete record of the advice given.

MR. BUTNER: I would just also like to note that Katherine DeMocker, a few months ago, was being represented by Mr. Kottke.

THE COURT: I noted that, and I noticed that Mr. Kottke -- or Mr. Dupont had not substituted for, but as we know, people can have multiple attorneys.

MR. BUTNER: And at that time, I had asked Mr. Kottke to set up a meeting so that I could speak with Katherine DeMocker about this case, and he basically declined to do so. I have not heard from anybody in regard to Charlott DeMocker, until Mr. Dupont became involved, and he indicated that he would like to set up such a meeting. And, of course, I told him that I would be happy to meet with both the victims and that I tried to do so before, in fact.

Quite frankly, Judge, it's not accurate what is being presented to the Court. And also, I would like to point out that it may be that the relationship with Ruth Kennedy, the grandmother of the girls, is strained. She is the mother of the victim in this case. I have had conversations with her, and I have had conversations with the brother of the victim, John Kennedy, and concerning the kind of evidence that is present in this case, et cetera. And

I would

1 Ruth Kennedy has also informed me that she has been present 2 at meetings -- or at least a meeting with Mr. Sears and 3 discussed the case. So they have certainly been advised about 4 5 the kind of evidence that is present in this case. suggest that the strained relationship in this case is not a 6 7 function of victim's rights or the Victim's Rights Statute or any of those kind of things, but rather, it's a function of 8 the facts in this case. 9 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Dupont, anything else? 12 13 MR. DUPONT: No, Your Honor.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I do have the citation to give confidentiality. It's 13-4430. And that's just to complete the record. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, to the extent that it has been raised, I think, as I say, that the State's portion of the information with regard to what was -- what they advised the girls of their victim's rights is something that Mr. Butner can submit to complete the record on the issue.

As I also say, I don't think it has any bearing on my receipt of the girls' statements, however, at this point. And since the matter is still under advisement, I think it is timely.

1 MR. DUPONT: I think so, too, Judge. And, you 2 know, I don't necessarily want to get into the effect of what 3 the victims' representative has to say and how they weighed 4 that versus the prosecutor and the judge saying something 5 different, but it seems to be on the right track again, and 6 we thank you for putting it there and for hearing us today. 7 THE COURT: I'm happy to have it there. 8 you. 9 And to the extent you want to be excused 10 and not sit through all of the rest of the motions, you are excused, and thank you for being here this morning. 11 12 MR. DUPONT: Thank you, Judge. 13 THE COURT: All right. Back to my question of 14 any particular order in which you want to take the issues, if 15 you want to take the Victim's Rights Statutes and Rule motion 16 up first, since we are somewhat on that topic already, I can 17 do that. But any preferences? MR. SEARS: Judge, actually, the order of the 18 19 motions in my e-mail to Martha was the game plan that we had 20 in mind that put the victim rights motion later in the day. 21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 MR. SEARS: But if I could be heard briefly on 23 what we just talked about. There is an aspect of that I

think the Court needs to know about in terms of how

Mr. Dupont became involved. He's unfamiliar with that -- if

24

25

I could just speak briefly to that.

THE COURT: You may.

MR. SEARS: Thank you.

Judge, Mr. Kottke, as the Court knows, represented Katie DeMocker in her capacity as personal representative of her mother's estate. Mr. Kottke is a trust and estate lawyer.

And when the topic of representing Katie in a matter beyond that, that involved her position as a victim in this case under the statute, Mr. Kottke made it clear to me that he was no more comfortable venturing into the field of criminal law than I would have been in probate and estate work.

And Mr. Butner may not remember this, but I communicated to him, I'm reasonably sure in writing, probably by e-mail, that the girls were looking to retain private counsel, and it would take them some time do that, but that he would eventually hear from private counsel, which is, in fact, what happened when Mr. Dupont was retained by the girls to represent them in this context.

And Mr. Kottke, to the extent he declined -- he was declined because it was, A, something he didn't do and, B, something we were going to try to help the girls address in a different way, and that is what has come to pass in this case.

But I also share Mr. Dupont's and Mr. Butner's view that it's certainly more than appropriate for Katie and Charlott to be given all the rights that crime victims are given under the law in this state, to the extent those laws are constitutional.

But having said that, Judge, we had a couple of things we wanted to take up preliminarily about scheduling so that we have an understanding of where you want to go here. In addition to moving trough these motions in the order that we suggested, we came away from the in-camera discussion -- in chambers discussion with the Court at the end of last week with the idea that perhaps sometime before Thursday you might want to have another session with the lawyers to talk a bit more about the probable cause and the Chronis issues. And we are certainly more than willing and very much interested in doing that if you wanted to do that.

But to the extent that you now have bench memorandum from both sides, you know, my thought on that would be that the scheduling of our witness is for Thursday morning, and we thought that perhaps if you were going to entertain argument after that, the actual argument on that motion could be done, logically, at the end of the evidence.

We don't know if the State has any rebuttal evidence that they would put on, but that is kind of what they are looking. But if the Court has time and any

1 inclination to talk with us some more about these issues, we 2 would be very much in favor of that. 3 THE COURT: All right. And that was roughly 4 what I was thinking, also, is the Chronis portion of the 5 hearing would be on Thursday. 6 If you want to talk about it before then, 7 if we get through the other motion before then, I am open to 8 that. 9 I forgot to make a copy of my own MR. SEARS: 10 e-mail here. So I can't remember what --11 The next one after the allocution THE COURT: 12 with regard to release was the motion to strike the death 13 penalty notice. 14 MR. SEARS: I think Miss Chapman is ready to 15 be heard on that, if the Court is ready, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: I am. In reference to what that 17 was all about, there was an October 8 defense motion to 18 strike the death penalty notice. The State responded on 19 October 15, and defense replied on October 20th. So I guess 20 it's timely. 21 Is that all right with you in going to 22 that next? 23 MR. BUTNER: Judge, haven't you already ruled 24 on this? 25 THE COURT: Not the motion to strike the death

1 penalty notice, no. 2 MR. BUTNER: Okay. 3 THE COURT: No. There was a motion to direct 4 election of F-6 aggravators that I thought I had ruled on, 5 but maybe somebody is not too clear on that. That is the 6 next topic after the motion to strike. 7 Miss Chapman. 8 MS. CHAPMAN: So, Your Honor, just to address, 9 this is the 15.1 motion on the failure to timely file the death notice. 10 That is what I understood it to 11 THE COURT: 12 be, too. 13 MS. CHAPMAN: Good. We're all on the same 14 page. 15 Just to briefly go through the time line 16 with you, Your Honor, which was laid out in the motion, the 17 initial notice was filed on October 27, and they -- there 18 were three factors alleged -- F-2, F-5, and F-13, at that 19 time. 20 The Amended Notice of Intent added F-12 21 on November 21st of 2008, and Your Honor remanded the case 22 back to the grand jury on January 22nd of '09. 23 A new indictment was issued by the second 24 grand jury in February of '09. And despite defense counsels' 25 requests, those aggravators were not submitted to the grand

jury, so no probable cause finding was found on those at that time, and no aggravators were in that indictment.

Mr. DeMocker was re-arraigned, then, on February 10 of 2009. And then on May 13 of 2009, the State again filed a notice again alleging 2, 5, 13 and 12. That was 90 days after the arraignment, and so 31 days after the time provided for under 15.1.

And then in June -- June 29 of '09, which was now 120 days after the arraignment, 77 days after the time permitted by the rule, the State amended to allege F-6.

So that is the time frame for all of the indictments and the notices provided by the State.

And as we pointed out in our motion, Your Honor, the Rule 15.1(I) is a mandatory time frame. It was amended by the Supreme Court after reading in 2002, and it affects the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. Whether or not it's a factor or a quasi factor, it affects your Sixth Amendment jury trial right.

And it affects every decision that the defense makes, because it affects what kind of resources are required. It affects the Eighth Amendment right, because it affects what kind of decision you are looking at. So every decision in a capital case is affected by whether or not you are talking about a capital case or whether or not you are talking about a non-capital charge, which is what the

aggravators do.

There are specific conditions in 15.1 for giving an extension of time. The State can do that by stipulation or by asking the Court for an additional period of time. They did not do that. No stipulation was reached. They didn't ask the Court for more time. They didn't ask us for more time. The Court didn't grant any extension of time. The State simply ignored the rules under 15.1.

You, under 15.7, have discretion to grant any sanction that you think is appropriate, and there is no abuse of discretion unless no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under similar circumstances, and that is found in State v. Armstrong.

One of the factors that you consider when considering a sanction under 15.7 is the significance of the information. And I think when you look at the significance of the death notice, when you look at what is affected by the death notice, what the death notice really does is transform a charge of first degree murder into a charge of capital murder. And again, that affects a defendant's Sixth Amendment right. It affects a defendant's Eighth Amendment right. It affects a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right. It affects what kind of resources are going to be involved in case. It affects every decision a lawyer makes in trying and resourcing, investigating a case. It is the most significant

piece of information a defendant experiences in a criminal defense case.

And so I think extraordinary measures are required as a whole death is a different line of jurisprudence, which is included in the motion. I think there is no more significant peace of information when you are considering what kind of sanction should be imposed. I would ask you to consider that heavily under the 15.7 analysis.

I would also ask you to consider that the State has refused to comply with other parts of Rule 15, in that they haven't identified any documents that they intend to rely on with respect to specific mitigators, which they are required to list under the rules. So while they might -- and in their response they responded by saying, well, there is no prejudice to you, defendant, because you know what the aggravators are, and you had time to prepare for trial.

Well, given their continued failure to comply with this rule and many other rules by saying we need more time to analyze these aggravators, and given their failure to list specific documents that they intend to rely on, which is also required under the rule, we are not in a position to prepare what the rules contemplate that we are going to be under, because of their continued failure to comply with these rules.

And Your Honor, as I pointed out in the reply, their continued failure to abide by this rule and other rules under 15.7 is also a violation of the separation of powers. Because if the prosecution in the State is only required to comply with the rules that are set under the law and under the constitution by the Supreme Court, then the prosecution is, in effect, controlling what process is required. And that under the constitution is provided for by the Supreme Court, and that is what defendants are entitled to in criminal cases. And the prosecution in this case has continued to ignore those rules and treat them as if they are only suggestions that should be followed when it's convenient for them.

The other thing that you consider under 15.7, Your Honor, is what is the effect on the prosecution and the victim in the event that you impose the sanction.

And Your Honor, if you dismiss the death notice, the effect is a sentencing option is limited. That is the effect.

There are other sentencing options for the State, and I cited Your Honor to the <u>Barrs</u> case, which held that continuance is not the only proper remedy, and that you need not consider less stringent sentencing sanctions when the only loss is a sentencing option. So under 15.7 you have the authority to do it, and under 15.1(I) it is mandatory.

,

They didn't provide any reason for not doing it, not complying with the rule, other than -- I honestly don't know what their reasoning is, other than they didn't think of it with respect to F-6, and other than that they didn't think they needed to follow the rule because you had remanded it. And frankly, that is no reason at all, and we'd ask you to dismiss the notice.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, the rule requires that the notice be filed in a timely fashion that the State is seeking the death penalty, and that was done. This has been a capital case, basically, from the get-go. There has been a remand motion, and there were modifications in the aggravators that were filed by the State, but those modifications, the last of which was back in June of this year, that is still 11 months before the presumed trial date in this case.

I have heard not one single word to suggest that there has been any prejudice to the defense in this case. And we've cited the cases of Holmberg vs. de Leon and State vs. Cropper to the Court to basically demonstrate that that is the requirement here, that there is prejudice to the defense in this case, and they don't have any. There hasn't been any prejudice.

In fact, they have had voluminous disclosure in this case. That has been the real problem in the case, that there is a tremendous amount of disclosure. And the State has been, quite frankly, scrambling to get all of that information to the defense, but we've managed to do that.

They clearly have ample time to prepare for a defense, they clearly have had adequate notice. This is a notice-pleading state, of course. These kinds of notices are what are required by the rules, and the State has complied with the rules in that regard, and we have done it as quickly as possible.

So to ask that the death penalty be stricken on the basis that the State hasn't timely complied with the rule is disingenuous to suggest that. The State did timely comply with the rule of noticing the death penalty. The problem has been in terms of amendments thereafter, but we have a remand that took place in this case, we have change in prosecutors, we have voluminous disclosure. The State has done its best to keep abreast of all of these things, making minor amendments along the way, but never changing the fact that the State was seeking the death penalty and that this was a capital case right from the beginning.

So I would ask that -- and by the way, there is nothing to require the Court to impose some kind of

sanctions upon the State, particularly when you can see that 1 2 good faith has been demonstrated by the State in this case. So I would ask that the Court deny the defense motion to 3 4 strike the death penalty. Thank you. 5 THE COURT: Ms. Chapman. 6 MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, I guess the only 7 response is I don't know if we are reading the same rule, but 15.1(I) doesn't say anything about a reasonable disclosure. 8 9 It says 60 days after the arraignment. There is nothing unclear about it. 10 And, you know, I don't think it's 11 12 disingenuous to ask the State to comply by the rules that the 13 Supreme Court provides for disclosure. It is not 14 discretionary. It is mandatory. That is what they are 15 required to do. They didn't do it. The first one was within 60 days 16 THE COURT: 17 of the first indictment. 18

MS. CHAPMAN: That's correct.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Is there anything in Rule 15.1(I) that restricts the prosecution from filing the death penalty notice before the indictment -- or before the arraignment? Excuse me.

MS. CHAPMAN: It says it shall be 60 days after the arraignment, no later than 60 days.

THE COURT: No, it says no later than 60 days.

1 MS. CHAPMAN: No later than 60 days after the 2 arraignment in Superior Court. 3 THE COURT: It doesn't say it can't be filed 4 before the arraignment. 5 MS. CHAPMAN: Right. But he was arraigned on the first indictment -- he wasn't arraigned, excuse me, on 6 7 the second indictment until February 10. So the question is 8 once you remanded him on January 22nd, '09, was he indicted 9 where there was no indictment in effect once he was remanded. 10 THE COURT: Is there a requirement that -- is 11 there some case law on a re-indicted case that strikes the 12 death penalty notice that has already been given in the same 13 case? 14 MS. CHAPMAN: You mean a case where someone 15 has been remanded? The case that we have here. 16 THE COURT: Yeah. 17 Is there anything similar in the case law that says that the notice that is provided in a timely fashion before the remand 18 19 occurs is somehow wiped off the books by the remand? 20 MS. CHAPMAN: Well, I don't know, except you could analogize that if they hadn't re-indicted him -- I 21 22 mean, there would be no charge against him. It doesn't stay 23 in effect once the case has been remanded. I am happy to 24 supplement briefing for you on that question.

25

But I also think that even if that is

1 true, the F-6 amendment would be untimely under any analysis, even if --2 3 THE COURT: Is there a proscription against an 4 amendment to a death penalty notice with regard to particular 5 aggravating circumstances? Well, the prosecutor has to 6 MS. CHAPMAN: 7 provide the list of aggravating circumstances concurrently. That is (I)(2). 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 10 So the list has to be provided MS. CHAPMAN: concurrently with a notice. 11 THE COURT: Is there any proscription against 12 13 amending the notice? Well, you would, again, have to 14 MS. CHAPMAN: 15 go through the process of requesting an additional extension. I mean, to the extent you could get an extension to file the 16 17 notice and so the list of aggravators, you would have to go through the same process, that is, asking the Court --18 THE COURT: Where is that provided in the 19 20 rule? "This period may be extended for 21 MS. CHAPMAN: 30 days." It's the (I)(1) provision about extension. 22 There isn't anything in 15.1(I) 23 THE COURT: 24 that provides -- that says an amendment is not allowed, is

25

there?

1 MS. CHAPMAN: I'm sorry? 2 THE COURT: Is there any particular language in 15.1(I) that --3 4 MS. CHAPMAN: About an amendment? 5 THE COURT: -- That disallows an amendment of 6 aggravating factors? 7 What it allows is that MS. CHAPMAN: No. whatever specific aggravators were going to be alleged have 8 9 to be listed at the same time that you give your notice of 10 intent. That is what (I)(2) says. "When you file your notice of intent, the prosecutor shall at the same time 11 12 provide the defendant with the list of aggravating 13 circumstances." 14 THE COURT: Let me bounce back to Mr. Butner, 15 because I may want to have him respond to that. 16 Mr. Butner, what is there, conversely, in 17 Rule 15.1(I) that would allow an amendment of the death penalty notice to add the particular factor that was added or 18 alleged June 29? 19 MR. BUTNER: Judge, I think that the focus of 20 the rule, quite frankly, is to, first of all, provide notice 21 that the State is seeking the death penalty. That's what was 22 23 done. And at that time, it says, "a list of aggravating 24 circumstances the State will rely upon at the aggravation

hearing in seeking the death penalty."

25

1

2

3 4

5

6

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Now, that aggravation hearing presumably takes place after the jury has convicted the defendant. it's a notice type of requirement. There is nothing in there to indicate anything at all about whether amendments are prescribed or proscribed. Doesn't say anything about that.

But it seems to me, a common sense reading of these kinds of rules and recognizing that Arizona is a notice-pleading state, and that this whole rule is directed at notice to the defense, that, first of all, the State has given timely notice that we are seeking the death penalty.

Secondly, when it becomes apparent to the prosecutor after a list of aggravating circumstances have been filed at the same time as that death penalty notice that there are additional factors that would be present, additional evidence that would give rise to other aggravating factors, that you should notice those factors as quickly as they become apparent to the prosecutor. That is exactly what was done in this case.

Why wasn't that notice with regard THE COURT: to F-6 -- I think it was -- why wasn't that provided in the first notice?

I suspect because I wasn't the MR. BUTNER: prosecutor, would be the main reason. I really don't know, because I wasn't involved with this case at that time.

It became apparent to me that the facts would give rise to that after finding out the manner -- understanding the true manner in which the victim was killed in this case. And of course, we have already heard evidence about that.

And so as soon as I became sufficiently familiar with the case to provide such a notice, I did that.

THE COURT: I understand there was a change over of particular counsel, but the State is the State.

MR. BUTNER: I agree, Judge. And of course, I am carrying the work that was done before me, and I am proud of that, and I am also carrying, maybe, some omissions that weren't there or -- basically, not so much omissions, but the fact that I am a different prosecutor, and I recognize that there was evidence in this case that certainly gave rise to an F-6 aggravator.

There is nothing in this rule to preclude the State amending and filing such an aggravator, and we certainly did that in a timely fashion -- in fact, almost as quickly as I came on board, so as not to prejudice the defense at the time of trial in this case, in order to give them ample notice to defend.

THE COURT: Please, back to you.

MS. CHAPMAN: Sure. Your Honor, if I might -if you look -- the legislature, when they want to provide for

1 amendment of time to specific provisions within 15.1, they 2 And they did with respect to the notice that the 3 prosecutor is required to give under 15.1(I)(3), which is directed to the disclosure of names and addresses and lists 4 5 of papers and documents. If you look at 15.(I)(4), it says that 6 7 the Court may "enlarge the time under 15.(I)(3) to be amended upon a showing of good cause by the prosecution or upon 8 stipulation." That is limited to (3). It does not include 9 10 the provision under (I)(1) or (I)(2) that we are dealing with here. So it seems, by exclusion, the legislature did not 11 require an amendment or the Court to --12 THE COURT: The Supreme Court, you mean? 13 14 MS. CHAPMAN: Right. Excuse me. The Supreme Court didn't require amendment for good cause or any other 15 reason of the notice, and it does give a specific time frame 16 of 60 days, and it does require the circumstances to be 17 provided at the same time -- under (1) and (2). 18 19 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else that you wanted to say 20 21 about that? No, Your Honor. MS. CHAPMAN: 22 THE COURT: I think that the Supreme Court 23 rules -- and they are the ones that pass the rules of 24

criminal procedure and Rule 15.1, specifically -- provide

for the additional disclosure in a capital case under Subsection (I), and that requires the prosecution no later than 60 days after arraignment in Superior Court to provide defendant notice of whether or not the death penalty is being sought.

And I don't disagree with counsel for the State that Arizona is a notice-pleading state. And the purpose of providing for that relatively early decision and early requirement is to allow the additional qualitative differences in a death penalty case and put the defense on early notice with regard to that -- and provide that same notice to the Superior Court, which also is required to do different things in the circumstances of a death penalty case than it is in a case in which the death penalty is not at issue. It is a murder case with other penalties.

The rule itself doesn't speak to the issue of how early the death penalty can be noticed. It doesn't restrict the State from filing the notice after the complaint is filed and before an arraignment takes place, and so I would find that the State's notice of the death penalty in this case was timely. It took place no later than 60 days after the arraignment in Superior Court, in particular with regard to the putting the defense on notice that the death penalty was being sought.

So I don't believe that simply based on

the timing of the remand, the second grand jury, the fact that the State did not formalize a re-allegation of the various factors for which they were seeking the death penalty on May 13, 2009, is something that is sanctionable.

The -- acknowledging the provisions of Subsection (I)(4), I am also not going to strike the allegations, at this point, with regard to the F-6 amended allegation that the State didn't make until June 29, 2009, again finding that no prejudice has been shown with regard to that issue.

We are still dealing with, of course, the Chronis hearing. Chronis came out roughly the same time as the State filed its F-6 amendment, and so we are still dealing with whether or not there is probable cause to support that particular subsection. We will get to that in the Chronis hearing.

But the motion to strike is denied.

The election of F-6 aggravators is the next one that I had on the list. I think my bailiff has provided each of you a copy.

The Court notes that --

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Excuse me just a second -- that we have had supplementation in terms of the bench memorandum with regard to the Chronis issues. So that has been flushed

1 out to some extent, even beyond the motion itself. 2 Yes, Miss Chapman. MS. CHAPMAN: I just wanted to go back for one 3 4 second and make sure I didn't misspeak and that the record is 5 clear. This 15.1(I)(4), which provides for an 6 7 enlargement of time, does not apply to an enlargement of time 8 to amend a list of aggravators. THE COURT: I recognize what you said. 9 Okay. I just wanted to make 10 MS. CHAPMAN: 11 Thank you. sure. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. No problem with clarifying the record at any time. Please do so. 13 14 Mr. Sears, are you addressing the next 15 one? 16 MR. SEARS: I am. THE COURT: Go ahead. I am going to take this 17 issue, and then we will take a break for the morning. 18 MR. SEARS: Thank you. I appreciate that, 19 20 Your Honor. Your Honor, in our motion we asked the 21 Court to order the State to elect which of the three prongs 22 23 in F-6 they intended to proceed on, if this matter went to a 24 penalty phase. And we provided you with some authority for 25 that requirement, principally to avoid the possibility that a penalty jury could render confusing, contradictory, and perhaps inconsistent verdicts and non-unanimous verdicts if the State was not electing which ones to proceed on.

And in there from a number of sources, beginning with both of the grand jury presentations, the evidence that they offered at the multi-day Simpson hearing, earlier this year and late last year, and particularly the evidence that has been adduced in the five days of the Chronis hearing and provided to the Court, as you just noted, in the bench memorandum that the State has submitted, our assessment is that the State has essentially abandoned the heinous prong. They have not offered, that we can see, any evidence that Arizona case law would describe or define as supporting a finding that under F-6 this was an especially heinous murder.

Instead, what we understand the State to be doing is to be proceeding, if at all, on the cruel and depraved prongs of F-6. And I have not heard from the State whether that is their position today. If it is, I think that is all that needs to be said on this.

If they have a different view and want to proceed on a heinous prong, then I think we need to step back for a moment and examine what the evidence is at this point.

And that may be beyond the scope of this motion, which was simply to direct them to elect, and may be both the subject

of your ruling on the <u>Chronis</u> issues when we get to that, but in addition, also something that could be dealt with by a subsequent motion that could perhaps be heard in January of next year, if the State intends to proceed and somehow is able to establish to your satisfaction that they have probable cause on the heinous prong on F-6.

THE COURT: I guess one of the confusing aspects for me of the subtleness of the Supreme Court language with regard to heinous or depraved is sometimes the Supreme Court doesn't seem particularly clear about the gratuitous violence, whether they are plugging it in under "depraved" or whether they're plugging it in under "heinous." I understand that that's the allegation that the State is making with regard to that aspect of F-6.

Do you have any observations or comments with regard to that?

MR. SEARS: I share the Court's general assessment that Arizona and the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on these points is difficult to work through. But we think at the end, that there is a pretty clear distinction in the case law, certainly between cruelty and depravity, particularly as to the facts of this case have developed. And we think that logically and jurisprudentially, "heinous" means something else. It is not a subset of depravity or cruelty. It has its own particular

meaning.

And we provided the Court with what I think is the baseline Arizona case law on that point. And we will talk about this in the context of other motions throughout the course of the day today.

But the way we see the evidence presented by the State at this point is that they have a theory of the cruelty prong under F-6 that based on the conscious infliction of pain and fear and defensive wounds.

And then they have an argument that seems to be in the alternative, that to the extent that the evidence wouldn't support a finding of cruelty because of what we think is evidence, that the victim was unconscious almost immediately, then this was a case of overkill. And we noted your comments in chambers, Your Honor, about this, in which you said, essentially, that you get the distinction and you see that the argument about depravity is related, at least in part, to the number of blows that Dr. Keen has identified.

And so we see those, in one sense, as being mirror opposites -- that cruelty requires consciousness and fear and actual sensation of pain.

The depravity argument would cover the situation that if the Court didn't find that from the evidence that there was so many blows, that it was beyond the

force necessary to kill and was some sort of overkill, and that under the case law that could be treated as evidence of depravity on the part of the assailant in this case.

Stuck in the middle someplace is the prong dealing with heinousness, which I know the Court can think of a number of synonyms from the case law, because that is what we sometimes have to resort to is that when you are talking about heinousness in the context of F-6 and aggravation in a capital case, it calls to mind cases involving mutilation of a corpse. And I would agree that "relishing" and some of those other concepts that they talk about in Gretzer and Murdaugh tend to also implicate cruelty.

But the distinction I think that we have to keep in mind is that in those cases -- <u>Gretzer</u>, for example -- they were proceeding on all of the prongs of F-6, as I understand the facts in that case. So the same conduct could form the basis for a finding of heinousness and a finding of depravity.

But we think the State has positioned itself, with regard to the evidence that is presented thus far in five days of hearing, to be either/or -- either cruel or depraved and not, in addition, somehow, a heinous event.

"Heinous" does not have, in the jurisprudence that we know about in this case, a meaning that is dependent on being also cruel or depraved. It has a

separate, independent meaning, and we just have not yet seen any evidence from the State that we can connect in our own mind to the aggravator, so that is why we filed this motion.

And if we don't draw some lines here, and the State were allowed to proceed with all of it but present evidence as to only cruel and depraved as the prongs, then the jury would be misinstructed. They would be given instruction on heinousness, which wouldn't apply to the facts in the case and wouldn't be something that the State would be pursuing.

On the other hand, if the State does think that it has evidence and does intend to pursue, then that will affect the remainder of the <u>Chronis</u> hearing and the arguments that we would make to you at the close of evidence in the <u>Chronis</u> hearing, about whether they have presented any evidence of the heinous prong and, if the Court finds that they do, whether that evidence would ever rise to the level of probable cause in this case.

This was an early motion that we filed.

We filed it before the <u>Chronis</u> motion, and we did it for that reason. So we are trying to -- in the context of a narrowing process, which is all that the aggravators are, we are trying to narrow the narrowing of it and get the Court and the State to let us know where this is headed.

THE COURT: Thank you.

¹7

1

2

Mr. Butner.

3 4 5

6

8

7

9

10

11 12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

24

25

First of all, I agree with Court MR. BUTNER: and Counsel concerning heinousness. It is kind of confusing in the case law in terms of where heinousness begins and depravity ends or vice versa. But to clarify the circumstances, the State believes that there is evidence and that we have already, in fact, presented evidence that of course this was a cruel offense, and also it was a depraved offense. And to that extent we have elected, so to speak, those prongs of that F-6 aggravator.

We are not seeking -- and I will clarify it on the record at this point, I thought I had mentioned this to Mr. Sears -- but we are not seeking to prove that this was a heinous offense. I don't think -- it just doesn't fit to the extent that I understand the case law. have that kind of evidence.

We have cruelty, because there is evidence that the victim for a while was conscious and experienced pain, mental suffering, so to speak, also, and that there were severe injuries inflicted upon her while she was conscious and suffered a great deal as a result of that. We then move past that, and I believe we presented substantial evidence in this case that there was gratuitous violence, that she was -- her skull was shattered and destroyed and mutilated.

1 THE COURT: You think -- you agree with 2 Mr. Sears that that seems now to come under the terminology 3 of "depravity" --MR. BUTNER: I do. 4 THE COURT: -- as distinguished from 5 6 "heinous." MR. BUTNER: I can't recall which case it was, 7 but the Court used "heinous" and "depraved" --8 9 THE COURT: Gretzer. 10 MR. BUTNER: -- talking about the same thing. But refinement of those kinds of things and reading other 11 12 cases, it appears that really that kind of situation -- and 13 that's what I believe we have here -- is a situation that 14 evidence is depravity, not heinousness. MS. CHAPMAN: That was Gretzer, and that was 15 16 six years ago. 17 MR. BUTNER: Right. A long time ago. Yeah, in fact, we quoted it to the 18 Court -- I am just looking at it -- where the -- and also 19 Reinhardt, where the factors used to establish a heinous and 20 depraved state of mind are "relishing the killing." I think 21 22 that goes to heinousness. 23 "Commission of gratuitous violence." 24 think that goes to depravity. "Mutilation of the victim." I think that 25

goes to depravity. 1 2 "Helplessness of the victim." I think 3 that goes to depravity. So we have all of those things present 4 5 with substantial evidence in this case. 6 Of course, we also cite to the Court a 7 case that I am fairly familiar with, and that is Bocharski, "Gratuitous violence occurs when the defendant uses violence 8 9 in addition to that necessary to kill and intends to inflict such violence," and I think there is substantial evidence of 10 that in this case. 11 12 So I believe we have adequately 13 responded. 14 THE COURT: I am not unfamiliar with Bocharski 15 and --MR. BUTNER: I know you are not either. 16 The end result of Bocharski was a 17 THE COURT: finding that the death penalty was not appropriate. 18 MR. BUTNER: Extremely disturbing, I thought. 19 20 THE COURT: I will not comment on that. Would you like my opinion on that, 21 MR. SEARS: Your Honor? 22 At your leisure, during the break. 23 THE COURT: I find the State has made its election 24 that it is alternatively cruelty or depravity, as they have 25

1 listed in their Chronis memorandum. So I think they have 2 elected -- I think the motion is therefore covered and moot. But I respect, Mr. Sears, your wanting to keep it clear, and I think it is now clear. Whether it has 5 support in the evidence on the Chronis hearing, we will still address that later. 6 7 Let's take a recess of about 15 minutes. 8 We will resume according to the court clock at 25 minutes to 9 11:00. (Brief recess.) 10 Record reflects the defendant is 11 THE COURT: 12 present with all his respective counsel and Mr. Butner. 13 The next on my list, and I expect yours, is the motion to set schedule for witness interviews. 14 was a motion pertaining to that filed by the defense on 15 October 7, and the State filed a response on October 13. 16 17 Are we making any progress toward that, 18 Mr. Sears? 19 MR. SEARS: Judge, let me tell you our 20 concern, and there may be a way out of this. You had 21 offered, long ago, to get involved with this issue if it became a problem, and we assured you, both when Mr. Ainley 22

23

24

25

What we gave you was a sort of a

had the case and when Mr. Butner took over, that we thought,

based on all of our experience together, we could solve this.

worst-case scenario, that if the State's list of witnesses, which has expanded even more since we filed this motion, is in fact their real schedule -- and for example, the 39th supplemental disclosure they served on us last week lists they're now up to 237 witnesses.

We have reason to believe that the actual number of witnesses that the State would use at trial is some significantly lower number. But just dividing that number into days prior to trial, we think, would require us to set aside three days a week from now until April to get all those witness interviews done.

And I have said to Mr. Butner before, and I think I've said in court, that to the extent possible, the defense would staff and be ready for interviews on essentially any day that the State indicated it would do these interviews.

What I was hoping that the State would be able to do -- and I am still hoping -- is to significantly narrow and fine-tune their list of witnesses, from whom we could then extract a list of people that the State believes that they want to participate in the interviews and leave us to do other interviews on our own. I know Mr. Butner wants to do that.

I also know very well that Mr. Butner, as the Court has observed on more than one occasion, is not

getting much dispensation on his side from other responsibilities. I know these are hard things to do.

Detective Sechez, from the County

Attorney's Office, has been working with us. We've actually completed almost entirely the review of all of the evidence in the sheriff's department's possession in this case. We had two full days of that last week, and at the end, with a few things that we noticed, we think we have had a chance to look at and inspect and photograph everything that the sheriff's office had.

What I am looking for here, Judge, is rather than an order directing Mr. Butner to do the impossible, which is stop whatever else he is doing and spend three days a week with us in interviews, as entertaining as that would be, is to just ask the State to provide us, as quickly as they can, a more refined list of witnesses, if that is possible, so that we can decide what needs to be done.

If the State's list is really 237 names or something close to that, then we have a problem that we probably can't solve. There aren't enough days to do it, unless big changes are made in the way things are done. So that is where we are in witness interviews.

We are very mindful that you must get more motions to continue from the defense in other kinds of

cases, based on inability to complete witness interviews than any other subject. We want the Court to understand that we have tried and will try to do whatever we can to do that. We are very much interested in keeping this May trial date and be ready to go.

And everything we have done and everything we continue to do is all focused on that as a real trial date. And we do not want to be in a position to have to ask the Court for more time because witness interviews haven't been completed. We will find other ways to get that information. That is where we are today, Judge.

So what I would ask for, in connection with this motion by way of relief, is that the Court direct the State within a reasonable period of time to provide us with a list of witnesses that it actually intends to call at trial, at the guilt/innocence portion of the trial, and to the extent that they are willing to do that, identify those witnesses that they -- for example, law enforcement witnesses, that they ask us to schedule through them -- and I am hopeful we can do that.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, first of all, I think the defense has acknowledged that they have gotten to look at and examine almost every piece of evidence in this case now. And I am sympathetic to Mr. Sears' remarks about witnesses and

narrowing that list and so forth.

In fact, I told him -- and I had hoped to be able do that before today's date, but I have not been able to. Some of that has been as a result of Detective McDormett's family's health, so to speak. They are passing the flu around in his family and -- in fact, he is home today with his child.

So we haven't been able to get together and go over the witness list to cull it down, so to speak, to be a more meaningful number. I do plan on doing that very soon. I would ask that the Court not order me to do it within some specified time frame, but I believe that it would be accomplished within the next couple of weeks.

And I will get that to Mr. Sears so that -- that that's not just for Mr. Sears's benefit, quite frankly. That is for mine, too -- the State's too. We need to focus the case.

In terms of prioritizing interviews, I would like to do that, too, and that is a little different than what Mr. Sears has suggested. What I mean by that is I think that when I go through that witness list with Detective McDormett, I will be able to say that, look, these are, so to speak, "A" witnesses that are extremely important and require in-depth interviews -- for example, Mr. Sears, I think, wants to interview Detective Kennedy relatively soon, and has

mentioned that to Detective Sechez, and we are going to try to get that accomplished as quickly as possible. She would be a very important witness in this case.

There are other law enforcement witnesses of a similar nature, but, as the Court is well aware,

Detective McDormett and Detective Brown -- they have been examined at length on the witness stand, and I would suspect there is not much new that they might have to provide the defense in this case.

So the long and the short of it is that we will get this done. And part of the reason that we haven't gotten it done is because we have been involved with these hearings before this Court, as of late, for a lot of time.

THE COURT: Any chance that you can get with McDormett by telephone, and he have a list and you have a list and start culling those down before Thanksgiving?

MR. BUTNER: I would hope that I can get something done with him before Thanksgiving. I would have to be out of court in order to do that, Judge, and I have been in court quite a bit lately.

THE COURT: Would the County Attorney respect an order from me to relive you of all your other cases so that you can concentrate on that?

MR. BUTNER: It don't think so, Your Honor. I

1 think you know that. I can tell your tongue is in your check 2 when you make that remark. 3 MR. SEARS: I would be happy to speak with 4 Mrs. Polk about that. 5 THE COURT: I imagine that would carry the day. 6 7 MR. BUTNER: Yeah. But Mr. Sears and I are going to get together very soon for Detective Kennedy's 8 interview, and I hope that I will be able to provide him with 9 10 a culled-down list about the same time that we get 11 Ms. Kennedy's interview accomplished. THE COURT: I recognize that I am keeping you 12 away from those sorts of things. 13 Are you personally needing to be involved 14 in each of the -- I mean, if you have a case that is going in 15 Judge Darrow's court or something -- is Mr. Sechez going to 16 17 sit in on some of --Mr. Sechez, in fact, has been 18 MR. BUTNER: sitting in for the evidence review. I would have liked to 19 have been there a lot more, but that absolutely was an 20 21 impossibility. 22 So the long and the short of that is he will be there on those interviews that I can't be there for 23 24 and maybe somebody else even, and I will be there for the

ones that I absolutely have to be there for.

25

1 The ones you regard as more THE COURT: 2 important? Absolutely. And that is what I 3 MR. BUTNER: 4 was talking about when I said prioritizing, too. I don't think that I'm the one that decides what absolutely is a 5 priority interview. 6 7 I suspect the defense and I will agree that we have certain witnesses that are much more significant 8 9 than others. There might be some disagreement 10 THE COURT: about who's in which column between the two of you. 11 12 MR. BUTNER: Right. MR. SEARS: Judge, I had a couple more 13 14 observations. 15 THE COURT: Please. By our count, we are 22 weeks out 16 MR. SEARS: from trial today. The date that we are looking at to do the 17 interview of Detective Kennedy is two weeks hence -- not next 18 week but the following Wednesday, the 2nd of December. 19 would put us 20 weeks out. And it doesn't look like we are 20 going to get any interviews done with anybody else, in all 21 likelihood, although we might be able to do other interviews 22

23

24

25

between now and then.

And I appreciate all of what Mr. Butner said, and it's nothing that Mr. Butner hasn't said to us

privately in the past. However, the fact remains that in order to just divide interviews into days, the pace has to pick up dramatically. And we are going to have to rely on Mr. Butner's office, whether it is Detective Sechez or Detective McDormett or somebody else or some combination of them -- we're going to have to be --

THE COURT: I am not sure I heard that from Mr. Butner.

Do you believe that all the interviews have to be set up through somebody in your office, either Mr. Sechez or you, or can you give Mr. Sears a list of those persons that you don't care to be present at?

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I wish I could control
Mr. Sears, but I can't. And I think he knows that he can go
out there and interview people, if he feels the need to do
so.

Of course, I would like to set up a number of these interviews, and of course I would like to be present -- or at least he could give us notice of when these interviews are taking place. I am sure that the major witnesses, so to speak, would both want to be there, and we both want to do those interviews.

THE COURT: You know, I know, and Mr. Sears knows that some people simply won't talk to him, though, unless your folks are there -- you or Mr. Sechez.

1 MR. BUTNER: I understand that. And to that 2 extent, we are there to help. 3 So I think that we can facilitate those 4 uncooperative witness interviews for the defense, so to 5 speak. If you could cull a list and 6 THE COURT: 7 separate this out somewhat, that identifies who you would like to be present for, who you don't think you need to be 8 9 present for, I think that would be helpful to Mr. Sears' 10 side, as well. He can go about contacting those that you 11 have less interest in participating in. Judge, I would just -- I know 12 MR. SEARS: 13 Mr. Butner doesn't want to be under a court order, and I 14 think I can understand why, but if we don't have --15 THE COURT: I am going to give a date, 16 Mr. Sears, if that is where you are going with that. 17 MR. SEARS: I would ask before Thanksgiving. And what I would like you to do, 18 THE COURT: and even if it is by phone -- but the trouble is I know that 19 20 it may require some time after our hearings are over this 21 week to begin doing that. 22 But if you could commence doing that, 23 Mr. Butner, so that by Thanksqiving there is at least a 24 list -- an operational list that you can cull down to who you

are likely to call, who you are not likely to call, so that

25

things can be set in a priority.

at least provide, to get with Mr. McDormett, even if it has to be by telephone, and go over the 200-some-odd names that you have -- those that are certain, and distinguish from those who you are certainly not going to call -- and distinguish them from -- in terms of who you don't need to be personally present at versus the ones that you think you are going to have to set up, simply by virtue of the fact that you know right now that they are not going to talk to the defense side unless you set them up.

So by Wednesday of next week, the 25th, that is ordered.

MR. SEARS: Can I make -- thank you, Your Honor.

Could I make one additional request of the State in this case?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SEARS: We have counted, in that list of 237 witnesses, 15 witnesses identified as experts. And in our mind, if they were going to be testifying experts or even consulting experts, they would be A-listers, if there is such a thing, on our side. And the first one of those people that we --

THE COURT: How many experts are there?

1 MR. SEARS: 15 is the number that we came up 2 with. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 MR. SEARS: And of them, we are particularly 5 interested in a man named Rod Englert -- the Court may know 6 him -- from Oregon -- who is an expert in blood spatter and 7 also crime-scene issues. 8 And prior to the start of the Chronis 9 hearing, prior to the October 2 cutoff, a seven-page report 10 from Mr. Englert was disclosed. But in that report, Mr. Englert listed a chronology of his contacts with the 11 County Attorney's Office and said that at the end he had been 12 contacted and told to stop work for budgetary reasons and to 13 14 file a report. 15 So if Mr. Butner has an answer to this 16 question, we would like to interview Mr. Englert, in the very 17 near future, if he is going to be a witness for the State. 18 And it's that part of his report that causes us to pause and wonder if this is going to be a witness. 19 THE COURT: Do you know the answer, at this 20 21 point, to that, Mr. Butner? MR. BUTNER: I believe he is going to be. 22 23 Yes, Judge. Okay. Then I guess you are on 24 THE COURT:

25

notice.

1 MR. SEARS: And I believe I want to talk to 2 him. Thank you. 3 THE COURT: You are on notice that Mr. Sears would like to speak with him earlier rather than later. 4 5 Thank you. Anything else, Mr. Sears, on that? 6 7 MR. SEARS: No, Your Honor. 8 If there are problems with a THE COURT: 9 particular date and you need a conference call, let me know 10 that. 11 But I agree with Mr. Sears and with you 12 and your observation, as well, that we need to get going at a faster pace on the interviews than things allow, currently. 13 14 If there is anything that I can do with regard to intervening with your bosses, I would be happy to do that. 15 16 MR. BUTNER: Thanks for the offer, Judge. I don't know if I would carry any 17 THE COURT: more sway than Mr. Sears would. 18 19 MR. SEARS: I am thinking possibly. 20 THE COURT: Hope I would. Anything else on that issue? 21 22 MR. SEARS: No, Your Honor. Thank you. The next one on the list was a 23 THE COURT: 24 motion to compel in reference to certain biological evidence. There was a motion that was made October 7th, and the 25

response filed by the State, I think October 8, and then the reply on October 20th.

Is this yours, Mr. Hammond?

MR. HAMMOND: I think it is. My first request is that we move back upstairs right away.

THE COURT: Denied. Unfortunately, they are selecting a jury up in my courtroom.

MR. HAMMOND: Thank you for taking my motion under consideration.

THE COURT: Although, I appreciate exactly what you are saying. I am not that comfortable down here, either.

MR. HAMMOND: This motion is one that I think probably deserves a little bit of conversation this morning. And let me start on an optimistic note on this one.

I think it is fair to say that Mr. Butner and the people with whom he works have attempted, with some success, in providing the information with respect to biological testing that we have asked for. We still have objections to the lateness of the disclosures, but I would rather not talk about the question of lateness and what possible sanctions might eventually arise from that, because our goal, really, in filing this motion primarily was to get to where we had all of the relevant information with respect to the biological evidence, so that we could then do the

interviews and do, of course, the preparation necessary for our experts. And I think on a lot of that they have come a long way.

But there are, I guess, two or three problems that continue, that I hope we can resolve this morning. One thing we have asked for repeatedly and have asked for in these motions and in numerous other conversations is the chain of custody documentation with respect to items of biological evidence that were collected at the scene, taken into Property In Evidence, then removed, taken to one or another of the two laboratories -- the private Sorenson Lab or the D.P.S. lab in Flagstaff -- to my knowledge, those are the only two labs that have been involved in this -- and then eventually brought back and put into Property In Evidence.

I honestly, Judge -- I don't understand why there has been any reluctance to produce the chain of custody. It is a standard form document that -- the State, I am sure, agrees that having the chain of custody is important for all of us. We need to know when things went from one place to another. We need to be sure that things that needed to be refrigerated were refrigerated. If there are things that are still at the lab, we need to know that they are there.

So having that record is bedrock for the

work that all of us have to do together. And I certainly don't want to put -- I really don't like these situations in which it sounds like some people in the County Attorney's Office are saying that they are prohibited or forbidden from giving us things we need by Mr. Butner, and I really doubt that that's happened, but we have simply been stonewalled on --

THE COURT: You don't have any chain of custody documentation on --

MR. HAMMOND: I think we have either none or virtually none. Certainly as to all of the important things that we have looked at, we do not have.

THE COURT: Any disagreement or clarification, Mr. Sears?

MR. SEARS: Judge, Mr. Robertson, our investigator and I were present at all the evidence review. And what we understand from the sheriff's department evidence tech, who participated in this, is that for all items of evidence, not just the biological evidence, that they have a document they call an "invoice," which, on the front side shows what was logged in, and literally the back of that document and then some continuation sheets is the chain of custody for each item.

Then she has told us that the evidence department in the sheriff's office maintains their own little

1 internal database showing how things are moved and also when 2 things come out of evidence and go to the County Attorney. 3 THE COURT: On computer, then? 4 MR. SEARS: Yes. And so the first line of 5 information that we would want, particularly for the biological evidence for the reasons that Mr. Hammond has 6 7 given you here, but also for all of the evidence, are copies of the backs of all the invoices for all the items that we 8 9 have now looked at. It is in the hundreds. But we were told as recently as last week 10 that that was not going to be provided to us, and we didn't 11 have it, so we thought it was important. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Sechez was with you at the 13 14 time, I believe? Yes, sir. 15 MR. SEARS: 16 THE COURT: And so was there a request made of 17 Mr. Sechez when you were there or of the person -- the 18 evidence tech that you were dealing with to just do it at 19 that point? We have done the evidence review 20 MR. SEARS: 21 in two pieces. One review of mostly documentation, paper evidence, things that fit in envelopes, was done at the end 22

evidence, like the bicycle and golf clubs and things that -- automobiles and things -- and also frozen

of August. And then we looked at larger items of physical

23

24

25

evidence -- evidence that was kept in a big walk-in freezer.

And that was done over the last week to get done.

And we had this conversation -- I feel better letting Mr. Sechez or Mr. Butner on his behalf explain what the position is. But we came away with the sense that we are just not going to be provided with that information, and the fact is we don't have it. We just never -- we don't have it.

THE COURT: Back to you, Mr. Hammond.

MR. HAMMOND: On this issue, maybe we -- obviously, Mr. Butner needs to be heard from.

I was present for one day of the evidence, and to say that there was a request for the chain of custody would be, I think, an understatement. I think it was pretty clear that we wanted that stuff, and it was pretty clear that Mr. Sechez was not in a position to give it to us.

THE COURT: Do you mind taking it in this fashion, Mr. Butner? I was going to go have him just go through what else he thinks is --

MR. BUTNER: I would like to take it in this fashion because, as I just leaned over to John and said, "Why didn't you talk to me?"

Judge, first of all, I've just asked Deb here, who has got all of this stuff on disk, to look, and we just pulled up numerous sheets of chains of custody that have

1 been disclosed. I could give you Bates numbers. Okay? 2 But I think it isn't probably the ones 3 that you are customarily used to looking at, and I do know 4 what you are talking about when you say the sheriff's office. 5 And I guess Mr. Sechez said to you that he is not going to 6 give you those things. Well, he is not. I will. You know, 7 he is not in charge of that kind of stuff. 8 And we will make sure you get the -- I 9 mean, I have to have the chains of custody. I don't get to put anything into evidence, you know. I can see Mr. Hammond 10 standing up and going, "Hey. Where is the chain of custody 11 on this?" 12 13 14 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Would you like a deadline on that? MR. BUTNER: I would not like a deadline. Ι get these deadlines all time, you know? And in this particular case, this is the first time it's even been mentioned to Joe.

> Wait. Wait. MR. HAMMOND:

THE COURT: I know it's mentioned in the motion itself, October 7.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, we can show you right now that we have provided chain of custody documents. I don't know what the problem is in terms of them not recognizing them for what they are, but I got Bates No. 2706 and numerous others in connection with that.

MR. HAMMOND: What has happened is -- and maybe I should have just called Mr. Butner myself -- but what I have seen -- and I can't tell you that this has been true in 100-percent of the cases -- but in everything I have seen, what we have gotten is the -- what I think you call the "property invoice," which is the front of the sheet. We were told, and I think this is common practice, that the chain of custody is on the back of the sheet. The backs of those sheets, at least as to the biological evidence in which we have an important interest, we have not seen. And when asked about that, we were told that that was something we would not be given.

So that is the state of our understanding. But I am sure you are right, that this is not something that the State wants to fight about. But it was in our motion, it was in our reply, and it remains unresolved.

MR. BUTNER: Well, we certainly didn't understand what you were talking about, I guess. I mean, because we thought we provided these things to you, and we have been all along.

THE COURT: Well, there being no objection, I will order that the front and back be provided.

MR. BUTNER: Yeah, we'll give you the backside, too. I thought that it had been provided, but apparently not.

1 There is a question, I suppose, as THE COURT: 2 to the -- what I am being told -- is the computer information 3 within the lab? 4 MR. SEARS: The sheriff's office, actually. 5 THE COURT: Yeah. Excuse me. The sheriff's office. 6 The evidence room. 7 I don't know to what extent that 8 information only pertains to where it is within the sheriff's 9 office or whether it pertains to sending information. MR. BUTNER: I think that we are talking -- if 10 they are talking about computer stuff, I think you are 11 talking about how the evidence people control where stuff is 12 located inside the evidence room? 13 14 They don't want to give that out. I will just tell you that. That is their own little program for 15 where they put stuff in there, but it is not chain of 16 17 custody. I don't see a need if it is only 18 THE COURT: in regard to location, where within the facility certain 19 20 objects are, Mr. Sears. MR. SEARS: And let me be fair to Mr. Butner. 21 You might make note of this. I'm going to try to be fair to 22 Mr. Butner. 23 MR. BUTNER: I will wait and see. 24 MR. SEARS: Judge, what the evidence tech --25

with whom we developed a pretty good relationship, because we spent a lot of time with her -- told us about this computer program is that in addition to showing where things are -- which shelf and which room and those kinds of things -- it also shows, what we think is an important circumstance for later inquiry, when things left there and went to the County Attorney's Office for purposes of being disclosed to us.

And then we were also told --

THE COURT: To the County Attorney's Office?

MR. SEARS: Yes. And we were also told that
the County Attorney's Office maintains a database of some
sort that is reflexive of this, that shows when they get
items and when they are processed and when they are turned
around and disclosed to us.

And as Mr. Hammond said and I have said today and certainly on other occasions -- here is where I am going to be fair -- that prior to Mr. Butner's involvement in the case, there was, as we see now, a backlog -- that things -- that work was done and evidence created, and only when Mr. Butner became involved in May and June of this year, did that garage get emptied, essentially, and sent to us. And we have gotten a steady stream of disclosure from May and June of this year to as recently as last week of things that, when we look at them, were done in 2008, for example.

And so it's important for us to

understand -- and here comes another "fair" comment to Mr. Butner -- we understand that Mr. Butner recognized this problem and this backlog and was trying to act on it, but that, as you observed earlier today, the State is the State is the State is the State and all of this material that was done months and sometimes even more than a year ago that has been backlogged, just because it's kicked loose and disclosed to us now, doesn't address the issue of this Court's previously enclosed discovery deadlines and may become the subject of important motions to be raised in January hearings, regarding the timeliness and admissibility of that.

So it is important for us to know as much as we can about when the evidence was collected, what was done with it, how it's been shuffled back and forth, what's at the lab, and when the County attorney knew about it and what they did about it, because those are our concerns. And it all ties to this larger problem that Mr. Hammond is talking about -- I will let him finish -- but this larger problem of this case didn't start when Mr. Butner got the case.

This case started on July 2nd, 2008. And evidence was collected that night and the next morning in this case, some of which has actually just been described to us within the last 10 days. It's evidence that's 15-and-a-half months old in this case. That is a problem for

us. It's not the subject of this motion, particularly, but that is a recurring problem.

Attorney's information about this, which I think out of fairness under obligation of candor to the Court they ought to give up, the sheriff's department information and the chain of custody information, we will be able to put that all together and piece together a history for these items that tells us what was done with it, when it was looked at, and perhaps really importantly down the road, why it took so long to get the information to us.

That is my speech, wherein I was twice fair to Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Duly noted. But let me clear up a misunderstanding.

First of all, there is no sharing of a computer program or anything by the sheriff's office with our office. Okay? I don't know where you got that information, but it's misinformation.

I guess they do have some sort of a computer -- and this is what I was talking about before -- some kind of a computer program spreadsheet sort of a deal where they have -- where evidence is located. That's internal, and the County Attorney's Office doesn't have anything to do with that. Just simply doesn't take place.

In terms of --

THE COURT: I don't have any interest in ordering the sheriff's office to disclose information with regard to location within their facility or facilities, plural, of where items of evidence are or have been kept.

I think what Mr. Sears was talking about was is if there is some information in a program with regard to timing of when items were provided to the County Attorney's Office, if you would speak to that.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I don't know about that.

It's the sheriff's office program, I guess. I just simply don't know about that. It isn't shared with the County

Attorney's Office, and --

THE COURT: Do you have any objection if they have such a list of information as to when items went to the lab that are kept on other records other than the chain of custody direct records?

MR. BUTNER: I do. I think that that is getting into their internal control of the evidence. I will tell the Court and counsel that the backs of these chain of custody sheets will be provided by the end of the week. And the only reason it wouldn't be provided by tomorrow is because I want to make sure that Mr. Sechez has enough time to copy all of that stuff. And had I understood that that was an issue, it would have been taken care of quite sometime

1 ago. I didn't realize that that was a problem.

THE COURT: With regard -- I am going to charge you with the obligation to find out if their program specifies whether or not items are sent in a separate format than the evidence sheets so that -- not location, but when they are sent out, either to a lab or other location, so that a comparison can be made between the documents kept by the sheriff's office as to the legitimate timing of that. And I think the defense is entitled to that.

So check whether such a thing exists. If it does, I will require that you disclose the timing of when the various items were sent out. Not location.

MR. BUTNER: I understand, Judge, and I just made a note of that.

In our office -- and maybe this is where the confusion lies -- we sign for copies of evidence when we receive it from the sheriff's office. And we have a copy of all of those things; right? Okay. Almost all of them. I don't know if we have all. But we can give copies of those things to them.

Is that what you are talking about?

MR. HAMMOND: That might help. Let me tell
you one of the problems that we observe.

When we see an item of evidence in the Property In Evidence room, it has an evidence number. When

we get disclosure, the disclosure -- and I don't know how
many thousands of pages we are at now -- but it comes with a

Bates number.

Often, we have had the problem of not being able to figure out whether the property item was the same thing that was produced when we got the disclosure. But we were told -- and I am sure that this is right -- that somewhere there is a document that traces that history, that gets us from the property number that the sheriff's office put on an item and your production of it. That has to exist somewhere.

That would be very helpful to us, because there are items that we can't tell whether this was really the property item that we got or not.

MR. BUTNER: Okay. I kind of understand, and I talked to Deb about this a couple of months ago, and it is a work in progress because it's so voluminous. But what is going on right now -- and correct me if I don't say this right -- we have got, in essence, a log that is being prepared where -- we are doing it with the new items and we're catching up on the old items -- where the Bates numbers correlate with the evidence numbers.

I think that is what you are asking about; right?

MR. HAMMOND: It is.

1 MR. BUTNER: And we are trying to get that 2 done. And I will tell you, I have been all over her about 3 that. Are you willing to share that with THE COURT: them? 5 MR. BUTNER: Oh, yeah. As soon as we get the 6 7 thing done, we are going to share it. If you want us to share with you, the partially completed log, we will do that. 8 She says it is disclosed every time we 9 10 disclose. Maybe you don't understand what it is. Maybe so there is no confusion 11 MR. SEARS: here, what we get from the State is an index every time we 12 13 get a supplemental disclosure, and we are up to, I think, 39 14 now, that shows -- that has descriptive language in it and will say "Report of Rod Englert, Bates No. so and so." 15 What we are asking for is -- that report, 16 17 as it turns out, has a Yavapai County Sheriff's Office evidence number attached to it. So what we have had 18 difficulty doing is matching up our review of the evidence 19 and the database that we created from that with the 20 21 disclosure. So we think that what is missing is --22 are the sheriff's department evidence numbers. 23 24 Mr. Hammond has an example of what we are talking about here. MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, might I confer just 25

1 with Mr. Butner for a moment about this? 2 You may. Go off record. THE COURT: 3 (Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.) 4 MR. BUTNER: Can we go back on the record? 5 We're back on the record. THE COURT: Yeah. 6 MR. BUTNER: Do you want to speak, Mr. Hammond? 7 MR. HAMMOND: Go ahead. 8 9 MR. BUTNER: We were just showing defense 10 counsel how this log is prepared and is being disclosed. 11 I think that now they realize that they have been getting, to 12 the extent that we have gotten it accomplished, the log. 13 They estimated that we are about a quarter done. I don't 14 know. She is saying they are being kind. 15 We are doing the best that we can in that 16 regard, and it is an on-going process. The new stuff is 17 being done, and the old stuff is being caught back up, just 18 as I described. And hopefully, we will get it done 19 relatively soon. 20 And I will tell you that this is the 21 paralegal on this case. 22 So to the extent that she is in THE COURT: 23 court, the same is the true of your interviews. 24 MR. BUTNER: It is kind of the same problem,

you know, but she has been working very hard and diligently

1 on this. And I do expect that -- you know, it's a big task, 2 but I do expect that we will get it done as quickly as 3 possible. THE COURT: You are willing to provide that? 4 5 MR. BUTNER: Yes. Absolutely. You indicated -- so three are THE COURT: 7 I have addressed that, I think. missing. I think so. 8 MR. HAMMOND: 9 THE COURT: What else are you missing that you 10 need? On the chain of custody, I think 11 MR. HAMMOND: 12 there really are two problems here. One is the 13 cross-referencing, and that is what we were just talking about. 14 And we will -- I think what we ought to 15 say today is that everyone now knows that this is a priority. 16 We will cooperate in any way we can, obviously, but we need 17 18 this done as soon as it can be done. If it is being 19 addressed promptly, then we will trust that the system will work that out. 20 21 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. MR. HAMMOND: On the chain of custody itself, 22 23 I think that between Mr. Sechez and the County attorney, they are going to take care of that right away. They are going to 24

copy for us the backs of the forms so that we can have that,

and indeed I think they may do us the courtesy of going ahead and giving us that even before they get it all Bates-stamped. And a copy will be given to the County Attorney's paralegal so it can get into our system. But it will expedite the process if we have that. So I think that will take care of what I believe is most of the chain of custody.

There is one additional chain of custody problem that I hope we can also sort out here. As we said in our motion, the chain of custody on biological evidence, obviously, lives beyond the moment that it leaves the sheriff's department. When it goes to D.P.S. or it goes to the Sorenson Lab, there is a chain of custody there. It is a critical part of their work in their laboratories. I believe -- and again, I could be wrong -- but I believe we have not received any chains of custody for the examination of evidence by those labs.

THE COURT: Internally within the lab.

MR. HAMMOND: Internally. And I know they always have it. There is just no doubt about it. And I don't think we have been given it. That was one of the things that we had included in our motion.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, if I could, I could address that.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. BUTNER: I'm just looking at -- for

1 example, Bates No. -- I think that's 3091. It is entitled 2 "Internal Chain of Custody Report." And it documents the 3 item description, "TSMEC extract 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, and basically just establishes that 4 5 she's relinquished it at thus and such a time and has her 6 initials on it and so forth. It's an internal chain of custody document. 7 8 THE COURT: And does it document which 9 sheriff's office number -- identification number it is 10 pertaining to? 11 Unfortunately. Here is the MR. BUTNER: No. 12 way they do that -- and these guys know that as well as I do. D.P.S. then has their numbers, and so you 13 14 go from one number to another and -- you know, if they could 15 make this more confusing, gee, I would really like to 16 congratulate them, if they could, because I can't see how 17 they could make it any more confusing. 18 THE COURT: That's a D.P.S. report? MR. BUTNER: Right. That is by way of 19 20 example, because -- we provide those with every one. 21 THE COURT: Sorenson -- do you have any from 22 Sorenson? 23 MR. BUTNER: She is looking for that right 24 now.

25

And also, I think, just to let the Court

As

1 know, we -- they asked for accreditation stuff, and we got 2 the accreditation stuff from Sorenson now. But to get into 3 their internal procedures, Sorenson has taken the position 4 that they are going to charge us a bunch of money to do that. 5 And if the defense wants to inquire and 6 have them spend a bunch of money to give the internal 7 procedures and document all of that, then the defense needs 8 to pay for that. And they will be happy to do it, and they 9 were going to bill us 250 bucks an hour to research that kind 10 of stuff. 11 MR. HAMMOND: Well, they'll give it to them. 12 Someone is going to have to pay for it. And my guess is it's 13 going to be the State of Arizona, one way or another. 14 MR. BUTNER: That's the way it always is. 15 a taxpayer I can say that. 16 We haven't been able to find any 17 Sorenson, so we will see what the problem is with Sorenson in 18 that regard. They certainly have to provide chain of custody 19 documents, and that shouldn't be an issue. 20 THE COURT: I will direct that you provide 21 that information to the defense as soon as possible. 22 MR. BUTNER: Okay. 23 MR. HAMMOND: And while we are on Sorenson,

let me move to one of the other items that I believe is not

24

25

yet resolved.

We have asked for the software utilized both by D.P.S. and the Sorenson Lab for their analysis, and we haven't gotten it. Maybe this is part of Sorenson's objection. I can't imagine that it is, but --

THE COURT: You are talking about not receiving the software; a listing of the software that they used.

MR. HAMMOND: Right. So we know which programs they used, because that's what they do to establish their thresholds. And obviously, their sensitivity thresholds are critically important to understanding what their conclusions are when they say that a particular sample is inconclusive, for instance. So without that software, we don't really know anything other than what they've concluded.

MR. BUTNER: So you want it identified by name -- the software; is that what you're saying?

MR. SEARS: With as much detail as possible.

MR. HAMMOND: Yes. And I think if they give us a list that describes the software with particularity, I think our people can figure out what it is. So we put in our motion, I believe --

THE COURT: That is on Page 3 of the reply, what they are specifically looking for, the listing of commercial software programs used in the testing, the name, the manufacturer, and which version it is -- if it's 2.0 or

 $\|2.1$ or whatever.

MR. BUTNER: I think that's the stuff that we are getting a hard time from Sorenson on, in terms of spending money to research and provide to the defense.

MR. HAMMOND: Well, here is what my experience suggests. I believe that if -- if step one, they will simply tell us which software they are using and confirm that they have not done their own modifications of it, then we can at least debate over whether they should provide that software to us or whether we should ask the Court to buy it for us. But I think we need to know that. It would be almost unthinkable that a laboratory wouldn't be able to answer that question.

MR. SEARS: And that would be to the extent, Your Honor, that our experts don't have that same identical software available to them, which may well be the case.

There are some industry standards at play here.

THE COURT: I imagine there are.

I will direct the State provide to the defense a list of the software programs used in the DNA testing in the case, whether from the D.P.S. crime lab or Sorenson, specifically the name of the software program manufacturer and which version was used by the respective lab, and simply an indication of whether or not the version was used with or without modification by the lab itself.

1

MR. BUTNER: Got it.

2

3

4

5

6

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. HAMMOND: And Your Honor, that may comprehend our Item 5 on that same page, the macros. now a little bit out of my depth, but I believe there is a related question. If the operation of the software depends upon instructions given in their macro, then we need to know They will probably provide that, but we were told that, too. by our experts that this is important to include, as well.

THE COURT: I will specifically also direct the State to obtain from the two labs information as to whether the results produced are dependent on instructions contained in macros, and if the answer is affirmative, then copies of the macros used or identification of how to obtain copies of the macros used. And if it is something that is proprietary, I guess we need to know that.

MR. BUTNER: I don't really understand what you just said. Thought I'd just tell you.

MR. SEARS: Did you write it down?

I did, and I still -- I'm looking MR. BUTNER: at it and I have not a clue what you just said.

THE COURT: I am granting No. 5 of the reply set of paragraphs.

But at this point, to identify it, if the macros are commercially available, if they can identify that the macros are commercially available and what the

1 instructions are, if they are standard instructions within 2 the field of expertise, then I don't think they need to 3 specify anything other than that. But if they are something specific that modifies the methodology, so that the methodology can be replicated by the experts, if any hired by 5 6 the defense, I think they need to know that. So I am only seeking, or ordering on 7 8 behalf of the defense who is seeking, information. 9 directing copies to be provided or research necessarily to be 10 provided. 11 MR. BUTNER: Okav. 12 MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, in that connection, 13 we probably should get back to Mr. Butner on one other 14 element here. 15 We believe that we have received from you 16 the lab protocols, but as we are sitting here now, I am not 17 sure that we actually got them from Sorenson. 18 I'm informed that that is part of MR. BUTNER: 19 what they want to charge for, is their laboratory protocols. 20 MR. HAMMOND: We ought to at least be told by them what their objection is to production, what cost they 21 22 would --23 250 an hour. MR. BUTNER: 24 I can't imagine -- frankly --MR. HAMMOND:

THE COURT: But in terms of protocols, what

1 they are being asked to do is to make copies of existing -- I 2 mean, to have somebody stand at a photocopier and copy it, is 3 I understand what the request is. So I guess I would like to know, if you don't mind checking on that issue, what the cost 5 represents and why they are asking for it and what their 6 specific objection is. Because other than that, it is simply 7 asking for something that may be available already on a 8 computer download to a DVD disk that would take ten seconds. 9 MR. HAMMOND: I think we can say with some 10 confidence that private labs have been called on to produce 11 So I don't think this protocols in lots and lots of cases. 12 would come as a surprise, and I don't think it would require 13 original research. 14

But if there is some question about it, we can certainly address it, but I doubt that there is. I suspect it is a miscommunication.

THE COURT: If they can give us a PQ of even at that rate what they anticipate the cost to be. I would appreciate --

MR. SEARS: And if they are hiring any photocopy help, if they would consider my application.

THE COURT: At 250 an hour, I may walk down there myself.

MR. SEARS: We can carpool.

MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, before I leave the

23

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

biological evidence matters, there have been a couple other biological evidence things that have come up in the last few weeks that have taken us back to the concerns that we have expressed about the late disclosure. And there are two in particular that are now simmering, that it seems to me would be worth talking about with the Court for a few minutes.

As Mr. Butner knows, the D.P.S. lab has apparently expressed some interest in doing some additional biological testing. And that biological testing, at least to our knowledge, has not yet occurred. Actually, it began to be an issue for us when we were trying to figure out what the chain of custody was.

But one of these matters refers to an item of clothing that the victim was wearing at the time of the homicide. And we were told very recently that the D.P.S. lab would like to do some additional testing.

Well, we went back and looked, and our records don't show that they ever did any testing of this particular item. And our records also suggest, at least from the evidence review that we did in August, that this particular item of evidence has been at D.P.S. for some period now, more than three months since the evidence review was done in August.

I don't want to supplement the record here, but just so the Court knows what we are talking about,

might I just show the Court a photograph of the item?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HAMMOND: If I filed it, I would want to file it under seal, but I would like the Court to know what we are talking about, and I will show it to Mr. Butner first.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. HAMMOND: The item itself, I think without much conversation, we can say is obviously covered with biological evidence of some type. It may be that the laboratory has discovered other forms of biological evidence other than the most obvious items on here.

But the lack of any evidence with respect to this particular item and the existence of testing now and a question, which Mr. Butner was good to raise with us, about whether that testing might be destructive -- whether there is something that would be tested here that would result in the elimination of the ability to examine part of that evidence is something that we -- I think our first position is that it shouldn't be happening at this stage of the case.

And I do not blame Mr. Butner for that, but I think it is really quite -- I don't want to say it's unimaginable, but it's hard for me to figure out how at this late date they could still be conducting an examination of that item. But we don't want to say don't do it.

THE COURT: I was going to ask that. I

wouldn't think that you don't want them to at least make an attempt.

MR. HAMMOND: I think what we need is really serious cooperation and maybe some deadlines on this kind of thing. We have a laboratory that has been assisting us.

They are quite good.

We have offered to have people from our laboratory go to D.P.S. to participate in the extraction and observe the testing -- the extraction actually being more important than the testing itself. There is not a lot, you can tell when you see the testing, but the extraction is important. But we've been told that D.P.S. will not allow that. They won't allow anyone -- even an accredited laboratory representative in their laboratory.

We said fine, bring the item to our laboratory, which is an accredited lab. Have someone from D.P.S. come to our lab, and we will do it. I suspect that D.P.S. objects to that.

And so here we are with, you know, five months to go to trial, with evidence that may be critical that is just not being processed in, what I think any of us would think of as, an expeditious matter.

And I frankly was particularly concerned about this when we went back to our records and found that it had been at D.P.S. for at least three months. If it had just

been something that somebody had had an "ah-ha" moment and had said, "My, God, how did this happen," I think I could understand it. But this is an item that they have had for a long time.

And so we were grasping, I think, for some help from the Court and the County Attorney for how to bring this to a successful and prompt conclusion. And particularly if anything is going to be destroyed, we think it is essential to have an order that we be able to have someone present.

THE COURT: Is this something new to you,
Mr. Butner?

MR. BUTNER: Well, it is not new to me. In fact, Mr. Hammond kind of described how this came about, and that is we became aware that this item was at the lab and had not been tested and said, "Hey, what is up with this? We need this item tested."

And that happened just recently.

Detective Sechez and I talked about this. And as soon as we discovered that, I got in touch with Mr. Sears -- and found out from the lab, too, that it would require destructive testing. And I let Mr. Sears know that, and he said don't do it. Okay? We want to have somebody present. We contacted the lab, and they said we won't let anybody inside our lab.

Now, what did not take place -- and I'm

1 glad to hear Mr. Hammond offer it -- and that is an offer 2 that, okay, we can do it at our lab. I never got such an 3 offer from either Mr. Hammond or Mr. Sears. I hear it now. He didn't, John. 4 5 MR. SEARS: I can e-mail it over the lunch break. 6 7 I don't think we have to wait MR. HAMMOND: for the lunch break. 8 9 MR. BUTNER: Okay. You know, I don't have an 10 objection to that. We thought that it would have to take 11 place in a private lab, and was not identified any specific 12 lab that the defense was using. 13 But it may be that that lab would be acceptable, or we could get Sorenson or even some other lab 14 to do this testing. But I do think that the testing should 15 16 be done. And it was, as Mr. Hammond described, an "ah-ha" 17 moment, where we discovered that "Hey, didn't test this. 18 What's up? Why not?" 19 THE COURT: Given the volume, why is it that 20 you think it would be destructive? They just told me that they 21 MR. BUTNER: 22 managed to extract such a small amount of whatever, that any 23 testing of it would be destructive. What I suppose is happening here 24 MR. HAMMOND:

is that there is some non-blood DNA evidence that was found

1 2 3 4 5 can't see. 6 7 biological. 8 9 eye. 10 11 comes with the extraction. 12 13 THE COURT: What is the status quo? 14 15 understand it. On this particular item, it looked 16 17 18 19 which -- you know, I didn't know about that. 20 21 22 23 24

25

by microscopic -- they do a kind of a -- a magnifying glass -- I quess is a better phrase -- look at the item. it may be that in doing the magnifying glass look, they found something other than blood that might contain DNA that we

THE COURT: Or that they think may be

MR. HAMMOND: We can't see it with the naked

But the destruction part of it really If somebody has already done the swab, that has either consumed the sample or it hasn't.

MR. BUTNER: Here is what happened, as I

like there might -- this was an item that we thought, well, maybe -- we got information from Mr. Englert that maybe fingerprints could be obtained from this item of clothing,

So then there is this special kind of process that you have to do. And then we said, well, before we do the fingerprint-type thing, we better check to see if there is any DNA, if you think that somebody had their hands on there. And then D.P.S. analyzed it and found some sort of

item of DNA in that regard. But I don't know if it was not 2 blood or what it was. I don't know exactly how that took 3 place. And then I found out -- that's when they 5 said, well, you know, it's going to be destructive testing if we test it, and that is when I notified Mr. Sears about that. 6 7 And we didn't resolve that issue, and I 8 figured we would talk about it when we came to court as to 9 how that could be handled. 10 THE COURT: What is your position on having Sorenson as a third party lab or the defense --11 MR. BUTNER: I don't have a problem with that. 12 13 I figured we would work that out. The D.P.S. lab isn't the 14 be-all end-all for this kind of testing. Obviously, Sorenson 15 can do it, and I am sure that there are other fully 16 accredited labs. 17 If Sorenson would do it and MR. HAMMOND: would allow someone from our lab to be present, that would be 18 19 fine with us. MR. SEARS: And charge us \$250 an hour to copy 20 21 the report. 22 MR. HAMMOND: So quasi fine. 23 MR. BUTNER: Apparently, they are a 24 money-making outfit. I have to find out how this works. THE COURT: That's what they do. 25

1 I will direct both sides work together, then, and see if Sorenson or the defense lab will do it and 2 3 allow the representatives of whichever side is doing it, the other side have a choice of labs to be present and 5 participate, if the D.P.S. crime lab won't allow someone else 6 in their lab. I quess understand that, given what they deal 7 with. MR. HAMMOND: But I think when you are dealing 8 9 with accredited labs -- and our lab is certainly highly 10 accredited -- I think it's quite common, actually, for laboratories to have other observers present. They do it in 11 their quality control process. 12 THE COURT: I think so, also. 13 MR. HAMMOND: So it should not be a problem. 14 I think it's more of a knee-jerk reaction. 15 16 MR. BUTNER: It isn't, with the D.P.S. lab, a 17 knee-jerk reaction. It's apparently a policy etched in stone. 18 19 MR. HAMMOND: It's a knee-jerk policy. 20 I would like to go a whole day without 21 citing Todd Griffiths by name, but I stand by my knee-jerk 22 response. And Judge, let me -- and the 23 biological --24 THE COURT: As long as you have the "knee" in 25

there.

MR. HAMMOND: Well, let's be sure we do have it. Life is long and the road is torture.

The other thing that has come up in this process -- and I will be quick about it, if I can -- while we were doing the evidence review, we discovered that there was at least one other item, and maybe more, but at least one other that was an obvious item to have been tested that apparently has not been.

THE COURT: As far as can you tell.

MR. HAMMOND: I believe we have confirmed that it has not been. It is a piece of molding that was at the crime scene that I think you've seen in photographs and heard witnesses talk about it. Is clearly -- to say it is covered with biological evidence might be an understatement.

I now believe that the County will want to test that, as well. And I think our suggestion is that as close as we are to trial, if there is going to be additional testing, we need to have some kind of an order that calls for us to cooperate on these things, so that we can know what additional things are being tested, who is doing it, how quickly it's going to be done, whether there are going to be other destruction issues. I wouldn't have foreseen it on the shirt, and I don't foresee it here. I don't think it will be destructive, but I think we ought to be working together on

these things that are coming up so late in the case.

THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Butner, to a standing order to communicate new testing to the other side, if there is some new testing being done, and if it may use up all of the materials in particular, so that there can be consultation, presence of expert, if you are going through a lab other than the D.P.S. lab, things like that?

MR. BUTNER: I think there is going to be more than just those two items for testing. I will just tell you, because I found out some other things that hadn't been tested, and I am, like, "Why haven't those been tested? They need to be tested."

THE COURT: Can you consult with them and provide them with disclosure with what you are asking to be tested, so that we can get a time line in place, if there is going to be replicate testing, something like that?

MR. BUTNER: Sure.

THE COURT: I will so direct and order that the State provide notice of what items are being tested. If you have a Bates number, that goes along with that, a time frame, what lab is doing the testing, what type of testing is proposed, whether it is being done at a location for which there can be cooperative presence by an expert from the other side.

MR. BUTNER: What if I send stuff to the

D.P.S. lab, Judge? They just won't.

THE COURT: That will answer the question and then -- but if you provide the information that you are asking the D.P.S. lab to do it, then I think the other side can ask that it be done by a different lab or to make some proposals to you -- if the whole thing is going to be used up. If it is not going to be used up and you can provide capability of other type of testing, then --

MR. BUTNER: Okay. Good. That helps.

Because, I mean, there is that bunch of stuff I don't

think -- the testing that I understand is going to take place

is not going to use anything up. It was just that one item

that came up, and I am, like, "Oh, we need to advise the

defense about this."

MR. HAMMOND: It seems to me -- and we do appreciate Mr. Butner advising us about it. But at this stage of the case, I think it is not too much for us to ask that we at least be provided promptly with a list of the items that they intend to test, so that at least our experts can help us look for issues with respect to those items.

THE COURT: That is ordered, and Mr. Butner indicated his cooperation with that.

Any of the other ten items that you have concern about?

MR. HAMMOND: I believe not, but let me make

1	one suggestion, since we are going to be together for several
2	more days.
3	I would like to double check with our
4	office. I believe the other items have been produced, but if
5	we could just have an understanding that we will check.
6	If there are any other items, we will talk to Mr. Butner
7	about it. If we can't resolve it, we will be back in touch
8	with you about it.
9	THE COURT: We'll revisit the issue sometime
10	later in the week. That is acceptable to me.
11	It is about noon. We will take a recess
12	at this point.
13	Did that cover everything down to
14	biological evidence?
15	MR. HAMMOND: I believe it does, Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: We still have at least another
17	couple or three matters for this afternoon.
18	I have a sentencing at one o'clock, so we
19	will start up at 1:30.
20	
	MR. SEARS: Thank you, Your Honor.
21	MR. SEARS: Thank you, Your Honor. (Whereupon, a recess was taken at 11:51 to a.m.
21 22	
	(Whereupon, a recess was taken at 11:51 to a.m.

HEARING ON MOTIONS

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE, MR. JOE BUTNER.
FOR THE DEFENDANT, MR. JOHN SEARS, MR. LARRY
HAMMOND, AND MS. ANN CHAPMAN.

THE COURT: The next item that I had on the agenda -- the record can reflect the presence of the defendant and his counsel and the prosecutor. The next item I had on the agenda was a State's motion for taking physical evidence in the form of handwriting. I think there was a request for that on October 27 and a response objecting to that on November 5th. I am not sure that I received a reply.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I don't think I filed a reply. Well, I didn't know that. I guess we did file a reply.

Mr. Butner.

The long and the short of it is we just got a bunch of handwritten notations on various documents, and we have a diary and all kinds of things, and these are notations on things that we think came from Mr. DeMocker out of his lawyer's file, most specifically, and then also -- you have already seen a bunch of the e-mails and so forth with handwritten notes on them. And we need to get handwriting exemplars, and we listed Mr. Hale as a witness so that we can

establish who made these notes on these various documents.

THE COURT: Authorship.

MR. BUTNER: Right. Authorship.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Who is taking this one for the State -- or for the defense, Mr. Sears?

MR. SEARS: Judge, as we pointed out in our response, just as a general proposition, particularly based on my long experience with John Hale, often times what he asks subjects to do goes beyond what we think the intent and the plain language of the rule are and to have actually the subject write out the questioned words, which implicates the Fifth Amendment where handwriting would ordinarily not implicate it, because it's not testimony. But if the defendant is being asked to write out certain words which are part of the State's case, there would be a problem.

But shortly after we got this motion, I approached Mr. Butner and said that if there were, as he says, a number of documents that had handwriting that they thought might be Mr. DeMocker's, that I would be willing -- and am still willing -- to look at those documents, and without waiving any other objections to foundation or relevance or hearsay or any other basis for admitting it, we might be in a position to stipulate that certain things were written by Mr. DeMocker. And I am still willing to do that

| in this case.

The only such document that Mr. Butner has suggested to me was that retiring agent's agreement that we heard about that had some writing on it, that Mr. Butner thought might be Mr. DeMocker's. But I think rather than spend funds to employ Mr. Hale, that is really what we are talking about, is a finite set of documents with writing on it that purports to be Mr. DeMocker's. We may be able to do that.

And frankly, Mr. DeMocker may be in a position to identify Carol Kennedy's handwriting, as well, if that would be of assistance to the State. We don't have any interest in obstructing things or delaying things. We are just not inclined to volunteer Mr. DeMocker to the kind of handwriting examination that I know Mr. Hale performs in case after case. But if that is what the State is aiming at, I think we can accommodate them.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: I think it would be better if we just got Mr. Hale to get the exemplars and have him analyze the evidence that we want him to analyze. I asked Mr. Sears about that one specific document, and he never did give me a straight answer on that, and I don't want to have to go through all of that. We are way down the road on this case, as we all know.

And these things probably should have been done quite some time ago. They weren't. Came to my attention that they needed to be handled, and I think without asking Mr. DeMocker questions about items of evidence and without asking Mr. Sears to stipulate about items of evidence, I think we ought to just get Mr. Hale on the job and get these things accomplished, and move down the road.

THE COURT: I think there has to be a substantial necessity for the -- showing a necessity for it, so here's what I am going to do.

I'm going to authorize the taking of physical evidence in the form of handwriting exemplars under the direction of the State's expert, but first I want the two of you to meet to see if you can enter a stipulation with regard to any of the particular questioned documents that you have. If you are unable to reach an agreed-upon stipulation by December 1st, then I will authorize the taking of the handwriting samples. I will sign it, but it's contingent on your making a good faith effort on both sides to determine what things really need identification authorship or not.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, I am in the Verde virtually every week to see Mr. DeMocker, and I could easily, I think, arrange a time next week to do that. And if Mr. Butner is around, he could -- or he could send me the list, and I could take them into Mr. DeMocker and get him an

1 | answer immediately on those.

MR. BUTNER: That's the situation, quite frankly, Judge -- okay. First of all, we have three days next week.

Secondly, I am in court pretty much, probably all day at least two of those days, that I can recollect. And it is just a real problem.

And thirdly, the evidence is over here in Prescott. You know? So it's very difficult just logistically.

I understand, and I will meet with Mr. Sears and try and gather up all of the documents that have handwriting on them, but I think the Court has already seen a bunch of e-mails with handwriting on them from probably Carol Kennedy -- I mean, that just seems logical -- and probably nobody else.

But, you know, that's the problem. So

Mr. Sears and I have got to meet someplace, and I guess I

have to get in my car when I get out of court, drive over to

Prescott, garner up this evidence, and then get together with

John Sears.

THE COURT: I think in terms that you all both have the copies of the documents that you are talking about, you can give him Bates numbers, he can -- I don't know to what extent you are computerized with all of these, Mr. Sears

1 or not, but --

MR. SEARS: We have them in court, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- I think they can be identified by Bates number, and then Mr. Sears can then take those to Mr. DeMocker as he proposes. If you all aren't able to reach a resolution, that is why I put a short -- there I am with a time line again, Mr. Butner, but --

MR. BUTNER: I understand, Judge.

THE COURT: -- I put a time line on it because it is something that needs to be accomplished. But if you don't have an agreement on all of the items that you have questioned handwriting about, then after December 1st, you can notice Mr. Sears on taking those samples.

MR. BUTNER: Okay. Thank you.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, we had suggested in our motion that alternatively if the Court were inclined to order an exam, that we be provided the exemplars in advance, and I would refine that in this way: that I would not give them to Mr. DeMocker so that he could practice using the exemplars.

But my concern, based on a long history of Mr. Hale, having used him myself and been on the other side of the cases where he worked for the State, is he has a methodology that he applies, and I would want to know -- because the principle objection we have in the process is

1 that it almost always involves writing out questioned 2 sentences and phrases, which I think is a separate issue from 3 just making loops and swirls and S's and T's and things like 4 that. 5 THE COURT: Well, I disagree with you as And so I am not limiting Mr. Hale on what 6 regards that. 7 samples he takes. I am fully expecting, Your Honor, 8 MR. SEARS: 9 that we're -- if we are talking about handwriting on 10 documents that have already been disclosed, which I am sure 11 we are --12 I hope you are. THE COURT: 13 Yeah. I am reasonably sure that MR. SEARS: 14 we can reach stipulations on those. 15 I share that reasonable THE COURT: 16 understanding, based on Mr. Butner and Mr. Hale, knowing 17 them, as well. 18 To the extent that you need any further action by me or intervention by me, let me know. But given 19 the number of documents and such that we're talking about 20 replicating a fair portion of those in some fashion or other, 21 22 I'm probably still going to be available telephonically, if 23 you reach an impasse during the time frame.

24

25

MR. SEARS: Do we have some sense of how many documents we are talking about?

1 THE COURT: Mr. Butner? MR. BUTNER: I can't tell you offhand how many 3 documents we are talking about. There is a bunch involving 4 Carol Kennedy, I think, but I don't know how many in regard 5 to Mr. DeMocker. Probably not a whole bunch. 6 THE COURT: And I will leave it to the two of 7 you to discuss if you want Mr. DeMocker to identify anything as Carol's handwriting. If Mr. Sears chooses to have him do 8 that, that is fine with me. MR. SEARS: I think I may have said this, Your 10 Honor, but of course we would do all of this in entering the 11 stipulations without waiving any rights we have to attack the 12 admissibility of any particular document, whether it's been 13 identified as Mr. DeMocker's handwriting or not. 14 THE COURT: I guess I will cross that bridge 15 16 when we need to. Anything else on the taking of physical 17 18 evidence? MR. BUTNER: Nothing further from the State, 19 20 Judge. Thank you. 21 THE COURT: Defense? 22 No, Your Honor. MR. SEARS: The next item that is on the list 23 THE COURT: 24 that you provided, Mr. Sears, is the -- ties into the first item from this morning, that is the victim's rights issues 25

rule made and statutory made.

MR. SEARS: Miss Chapman will be heard on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Miss Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN: Thank you.

Your Honor, we went through, I think, four separate arguments that I know Mr. Dupont spoke to some of them this morning, and I am going to take them in turn.

authority of the legislature with respect to their authority to enact rules, to enforce the rights that are enumerated in the Victim's Bill of Rights, and that is that the provisions in 4431 and 4433(B) through (E) exceed the limited authority that the Victim's Bill of Rights granted to the legislature. And that is -- the authority granted to the legislature was limited to rules that -- or laws that define, implement, preserve, or protect the rights that are enumerated in the Victim's Bill of Rights. And those rules that are listed and provided for in (B) through (E) do not preserve, protect, or implement the rights that are limited in the Bill of Rights.

And I won't -- I don't want to list them for you, because I've listed them for you in the motion, but specifically, a focus on the inability of defense to contact victims and the inability, then, for victims to likewise contact the defense, once they decide that they do want to be

2

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21 22

23

24

25

interviewed. Survivors are not members of the prosecution team. Their rights are not necessarily aligned. And the Supreme Court has acknowledged the victims are not represented by the prosecution or by the prosecutor.

The Victim's Bill of Rights, the amendment to the Constitution does not provide that a victim should not be contacted by defense counsel, nor does it provide that a victim should not be free to meet with defense counsel without the interference of the prosecution. However, that is precisely what 4433(B) through (E) does -it implements a system that prohibits the defense counsel or anyone from the defense team from contacting a victim, and even if a victim decides they do want to be interviewed, then permits the prosecutor -- in fact, requires the prosecutor to act as an interface between the victim and defense counsel. That is beyond what is required by the Victim's Bill of Rights and, in fact, violates the Victim's Bill of Rights. And the argument is, and we think because of that, exceeds the legislature's authority and ought to be struck down on that ground.

As you know and as we mentioned this morning, the Supreme Court has the authority to make the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and when the legislature invades the Supreme Court's authority, they don't have the authority to do what they are doing, and that is what we have suggested

and believe that (B) through (E) of 4433 does.

With respect to the second argument, which I think Mr. Dupont joined in and you had some discussion with him about that this morning, the argument is that both the Rule of Criminal Procedure 39(B)(11), which prohibits the defense counsel from contacting the victim for an interview, and the same provisions of 4433(B) through (E) that we spoke about a moment ago, violate the rights that are enumerated in the Victim's Bill of Rights. That is by telling a victim -- once you decide that you want to have direct contact with the defense counsel, you would have to opt out of the Victim's Bill of Rights and the rights that are enumerated there, that that violates the Victim's Bill of Rights.

And that's -- I think this morning, when it was referenced, Mr. Dupont acknowledged, and Your Honor has seen the transcript, that both the judge at the initial appearance and the prosecutor there read the law to require that a victim opt out of the Victim's Bill of Rights if they do want to have contact with the defendant. I read the law that way, as well.

What it says is that a defense counsel cannot have contact with a victim, and if the victim decides that they want to be interviewed after that request is made, the prosecutor shall communicate with the defense counsel.

So all communication between a defendant and a victim is contemplated to run through the prosecutor.

That is not what the Victim's Bill of Rights says. And, in fact, in this case, for the first many months that Mr. DeMocker was incarcerated, his daughters were prohibited from seeing him, and they did opt out of the Victim's Bill of Rights, because that is what they thought they were required to do and advised by both the Court and the County Attorney at that initial appearance that that's what they were required to do in order to have immediate contact with their father.

The legislature does not have the authority, either under the Victim's Bill of Rights or anywhere else, to restrict the rights created by the people through the Constitutional amendment. And the Supreme Court has invalidated other provisions of the Victim's Rights Act and Rule 39 when it conflicts with the Victim's Bill of Rights. And in Roscoe, the Court invalidated a provision that held up police officers or peace officers did not qualify as victims. And the Court in that case said there is plain language in the amendment that provides who qualifies as a victim and who doesn't.

And I think when the legislature in this case tried to narrow victims to those who don't want to have contact with victims, they did precisely what they attempted

to do in eliminating peace officers as those who qualified. And that is that they went beyond what the Victim's Bill of Rights suggests is appropriate, and they tried to further narrow the category of people who qualified as victims to those who agree with the prosecution or those who don't want to have contact with defense counsel. That is in direct contradiction to what the Victim's Bill of rights provides, which is that victims -- all victims, including those that want contact with defense counsel -- are entitled to be treated with dignity, and fairness, and respect. And these provisions prohibit that from happening. That's what happened to Mr. DeMocker's daughters here.

Your Honor, the next argument applies to the same --

THE COURT: Before we leave that argument, what are you saying happened here, that they were not treated with fairness, respect and dignity? I mean, clarify what your last comment meant.

MS. CHAPMAN: Sure. I am saying that because they were required to opt out, which is what I think 4433(B) through (E) and Rule 39(B)(11) contemplates, because they wanted contact with their father, they were required to opt out. I don't think that's treating them with dignity, fairness and respect. And I think that -- the legislature's rules say if you want to have direct contact with the defense

team, you are not going to get all these other rights, under the Victim's Bill of Rights.

THE COURT: Thank you. Go ahead.

MS. CHAPMAN: I think the next argument, Your Honor, is with respect to Mr. DeMocker's rights. Under the Sixth Amendment and due process, which require counsel to fully prepare and investigate his case and also requires us -- the Rule 6.8 requires us to be guided by the ABA guidelines. The ABA guidelines require us -- we have an obligation to interview witnesses and also to interview potential victim witnesses.

Ruth Kennedy, Carol Kennedy's mom, and John Kennedy, Carol Kennedy's brother are both victims in this case and they're also witnesses in this case. The rule here would prohibit us to have any contact with them because they are victims in this case. We would like to have an opportunity to reach out to them. And we've explained to you in this pleading and in others, in an affidavit filed by Dick Burr, the process of defense-based victim outreach. These rules, again, prohibit us from fulfilling our obligations under the due process clause and violate Mr. DeMocker's Sixth Amendment rights by prohibiting our ability to do that.

And lastly, your Honor, the State did not respond to this argument, but I think there is a First and

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16 17

18

19 20

21

22

23

24

25

Fourteenth Amendment, and under the Arizona Constitution, Article 2, Section 4 and 6, First Amendment right here, that we don't have the right, under these provisions -- and that's, again, (B) through (E) of 4433 and Rule 39(B)(11), to have contact with the victim.

It prohibits the rule -- 4433(B) says we can only have contact with the victim through the prosecutor's office. And (B)(11) provides that all requests shall be communicated through the prosecutor, and that the victim's response shall also be communicated through the prosecutor. So the communication both directions is controlled by the rule and also by the statute.

I won't go through the arguments in detail, because I think they are laid out in the pleadings. But essentially, the arguments are that they're overbroad and there is extensive case law that is cited in the brief about if you are going to prohibit a protected category of speech, you have do it in the narrowest way possible. The provisions here assume that all contact with a defense team is harmful And I cited you to the Federal Crime Victim's to a victim. Rights Act of 2004. That protection enumerates many of the same rights that the Arizona Bill of Rights enumerates but does not prohibit such contact.

There are more narrowly chartered ways to protect the dignity and respect of victims that the Victim's

Bill of Rights does, without broadly prohibiting all contact
between the defense team and the victim. And for those
reasons, we think these provisions ought to be struck down.

THE COURT: In point of fact, you have two separate categories of victims in this particular case. You have the members of the Kennedy -- the immediate -- Miss Kennedy's mother and brother. Let's put it that way. The daughters are no less immediate family than Miss Kennedy's mother. So my beginning to choose that word wasn't correct.

But you have the daughters who want contact, who want to speak to you, who have been speaking to your side of the case, and you have the mother and brother who haven't given any indication that they want any exceptions made to the rights that they have under the statutes under the rules or under the Victim's Bill of Rights directly. Agreed?

MS. CHAPMAN: Well, I agree that Miss Kennedy, as far as we know, hasn't expressed any interest in doing anything different on the Victim's Bill of Rights.

But what I will say is that we haven't been able to, because of the law, engage in any defense-initiated victim outreach, and we think that's a violation of our right and our duty under the ABA guidelines and any other --

THE COURT: Are ABA quidelines

Constitutionally provided? Has the Supreme Court adopted those on an equivalent basis to the Victim's Bill of Rights in the Arizona Constitution -- and the Arizona Supreme Court?

MS. CHAPMAN: Rule 6.8 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure require counsel in a capital case to be guided by a knowledge of the allowable ABA guidelines. So I think to the extent that we're being guided by those guidelines, and to the extent that those guidelines require us to interview witnesses and to reach out to victims' families, that is what we are required to do. That is what we are trying to do.

And I don't think that is the only way in which these rules violate the constitutional provisions. If you look at what the legislature has the authority to do, in terms of what they are doing to protect victims and their authority to create rules within the criminal system, prohibiting defense counsel contact is not what they have the authority to do. That's not what the Victim's Bill of Rights requires.

THE COURT: The only part of this case where it has that impact, though, wouldn't you agree, is on the Kennedy part of the group. It's not -- it's on Carol Kennedy's mother and brother; it's not on -- as far as the girls are concerned. The girls have been dealing with you without -- with exception since at least the point in time

where they understood that they had waived certain 2 protections of the Victim's Bill of Rights statutes or rules. 3 MS. CHAPMAN: That's true, Your Honor. only thing I would add to that is that that is precisely why 4 5 this is a problem. 6 The girls believed -- and I believed that 7 they were correct, as I had mentioned -- the Court believed 8 and the prosecutor believed they were required to forgo 9 their rights under these rules to have contact with us. 10 yes, they've been having contact with us, but for however many months they were not receiving the benefits that are 11 12 enumerated and they are required to receive under the Arizona Constitution. 13 14 So while they have been having contact 15 with us, they've been doing so at the cost of their rights. 16 THE COURT: The only one I am aware of is the -- I guess they misunderstood that they didn't have any 17 right to make any allocution about their position as regards 18 19 release. 20 MS. CHAPMAN: the prosecution. They have a right to receive information. 21 22 They have --23 THE COURT: 24

25

They have a right to confer with The prosecution since reached out to them by what Mr. Butner told me. I believe that happened, but MS. CHAPMAN:

not -- I mean, it wasn't immediate, Your Honor. And I would have to go back to look at the date that the letter was sent to Mr. Kottke. And I know that they don't feel like the information has been free-flowing from that office.

And I want to let Mr. Dupont speak for what happened with them, because I haven't had contact with them in great detail about their relationship. But what I do know is they were required to opt out, and they are entitled to certain rights under the Victim's Bill of Rights. And they were told by the prosecutor and by the judge at the initial appearance that that is what they were required to do to have contact with their father. I think that is what the statute says, and I think that's a violation of the Victim's Bill of Rights.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, there was a mistake made by the Justice of the Peace and the prosecutor at -- I believe it was that initial appearance on October 23rd of 2008 when the release conditions were established for Mr. DeMocker. But the girls weren't even present at that point in time. And when I say "the girls," I mean Charlott and Katherine DeMocker.

Thereafter, they were contacted by Victim's Services, and they indicated that they thought they

had to opt out. And when I say "they," I mean Charlott and Katie DeMocker -- Charlott and Katherine indicated to Victim's Services that they felt they had to opt out of contact with their father, and they indicated they wanted to have contact with their father.

Part of the reason that I wanted those communications filed as part of my response was so that the Court could see that right from the beginning Victim's Services was telling them "No, you don't have to opt out of Victim's Services to have contact with your father. That has nothing to do with Victim's Services, so to speak. That's a release condition that needs to be changed by the judge for you to have contact."

And on November 17 of 2008 -- not months after this initial appearance, but less than a month, and even that delay was occasioned as a result of two notices of changes of judge. On November 17, 2008, those release conditions were changed so that they could have contact with their father. They were still told consistently by Victim's Services that that wasn't necessary for them to opt out in order to have contact with their father.

I don't think the defense has standing to argue the Constitutionality of this statute. But secondly, I think they are incorrect in the way that they characterized the statute. The Victim's Bill of Rights, the Constitutional

4

changes, and then the statutes and rules that were promulgated to further those Constitutional changes were done to protect victims.

This is a different sort of a case. We have victims that have opted in, so to speak, and have wanted to be protected. And what are those protections from? Well, they are being protected from not being interviewed by the defense, unless they choose to do so, not having contact with the defense, unless they choose to do so, and then that is through the County Attorney's Office.

Obviously, throughout this case, except for that first about three weeks, Katherine and Charlott DeMocker have had on-going contact with the defense and on-going contact with their father.

I have spoken with Ruth Kennedy and John Kennedy. They haven't wanted to make any changes in regard to the protections that they are entitled to under the Constitution and statutory scheme for Victim's Rights. Ruth Kennedy informed me that she was even present at a meeting where Mr. Sears met with the family and talked about how they were handling the case and things of that nature.

And I am not pounding the table that,

"Oh, Mr. Sears communicated improperly with Ruth Kennedy." I

don't think he did, and she was there because she wanted to

be there.

1 I don't think this statute is 2 unconstitutional. I don't think it is unconstitutional as 3 applied in this case, and I don't think that the defense has 4 standing to argue it. The issue basically was release conditions, as set by the initial-appearance court. 5 6 This whole argument strikes me as being 7 based upon false premises and concocted from the outset. 8 have reached out as the prosecutor to have contact with these 9 victims and been somewhat frustrated in that regard for, I 10 guess, various circumstances. I am not sure exactly what they all are. I just haven't been able to have contact with 11 12 victims Katherine and Charlott DeMocker, despite the fact 13 that they had, at one point at least -- Katherine had an 14 attorney representing her. 15 So I would just ask that the motion be 16 denied. 17 THE COURT: Opting out. Where is that 18 provided for, specifically in the --19 MR. BUTNER: In the statutory scheme? 20 THE COURT: -- statutory scheme? MR. BUTNER: You know, I don't see that even 21 22 mentioned in the statutes, and maybe I am missing something. It's just sort of evolved, as I understand it, as a way of 23 24 doing business with the Victim's Services Division. 25 Where -- the typical case -- and this is not a typical

case -- but the typical case, the police officer is at the scene and arrests somebody, and the victim is there, and they fill out some paperwork right at the scene where the victim is given their victim's rights, so to speak. It is a sheet that spells them out, and then they can make a decision at that point in time whether they wish to be involved in Victim's Services or whether they wish to opt out. And I think that is where this comes from.

In this particular case --

THE COURT: Can you answer that?

MS. CHAPMAN: 4417 requires the victim to provide and maintain a form with their information on it. If they want to receive an update and notice, then that is really the only provision that, as I see it, contemplates that the victim is required to give information that they want to receive notice.

THE COURT: So either in the Bill of Rights, the rule or the statutes, there isn't a, quote, "opt out."

MS. CHAPMAN: No. And my understanding is that Mr. Butner is exactly right, it's sort of a way to get around how everyone, I think, reads the rule, which is that -- I think that -- you know, I don't think that the prosecutor and the judge at that initial appearance were confused. I think the rule says if there is going to be direct contact -- that basically, there can't be direct

contact, that the person has to opt out. Because the rule says the defense can't contact the victim, and once the victim says they want to have an interview, the prosecutor communicates that. So I think that's the system that is built up.

THE COURT: But it's not provided specifically.

MS. CHAPMAN: No. Only 4417.

THE COURT: I promise to come back to you. I will let Mr. Butner finish.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I understand what she is saying, and it is half right. But I have several cases presently going full steam where the victims have contacted the defense attorneys -- this is one of them, okay? -- and had nothing to do with me. Okay? And in fact, I think one of them -- they are opted in, so to speak. Okay? They still have decided to exercise their victim's rights. But they also decided that they wanted to contact the defense attorneys, and they have done that and provided an interview with the defense attorney, in one case, which they were kind enough to then provide to me.

But the point being that we are not controlling what victims do. What we are doing is attempting to protect them, and that's the purpose for this statutory scheme, to sort of equalize the balance of rights between the

defendant and the victim, and to make sure that if victims do not want to be contacted by defense counsel and do not want to be interviewed, that they can say, "Hey, I don't want that. Don't bother me."

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Miss Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN: Just to address what Mr. Butner just said, I am not quibbling with the fact that there may be cases where exceptions exist. I'm just saying this is what the law says. This is what 4433 and Rule 39 say. And is this constitutional? Did the legislature have the authority to do what it did, and does the law and rule comply with what the Victim's Rights says?

Remember, part of our argument is about what this law's effect was on Katie and Charlott DeMocker for the first couple of months of this case. But the other part of the motion is what is the law's effect on Ruth Kennedy's and John Kennedy's opting in to the 4433 provisions. And the effect of that is that we are not able to reach out to them and try to initiate contact.

Now, Mr. Butner's response is "Well, we are trying to protect them and their right to refuse an interview." And it's absolutely correct, and we are not arguing right now about their ability to refuse an interview, because the Victim's Bill of Rights says they do have a right

to refuse an interview. But that's not what we're talking about right now.

What we're talking about right now is:

Do we have a right to initiate contact with them directly?

And the Victim's Bill of Rights does not address that.

Victim's Bill of Rights requires. It doesn't define, implement, or protect those rights. It prohibits contact. That directly affects our First Amendment rights; it directly affects our ability to investigate and prepare this case, our obligations under the ABA guidelines. And in some cases, as with Charlott and Katie DeMocker, it affects their rights and what they want to do as protected under the Victim's Bill of Rights -- that is, those other rights of respect and dignity.

Mr. DeMocker's defense team's right, our right to reach out to Ruth Kennedy and John Kennedy, and request some kind of contact. That is what we are talking about with this motion. And the legislature went well beyond what the Victim's Bill of Rights says.

What we're talking about is

By reaching out to them, we are not affecting their rights to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect. All of those rights must be respected, and that's provided for in other criminal rules, the way that we approach them.

But what is not provided for in the Victim's Bill of Rights, but what is in this law and this provision that we're saying is unconstitutional, both because of the legislature's authority and because it exceeds what the Victim's Bill of Rights says, is our ability to reach out and initiate contact with them. And I think --

THE COURT: Well, isn't that what the rule -the rule also provides for the contact to go through the
prosecutor's office; right? So if Rule 39 provides for
that -- it kind of pokes a hole in your jurisdictional
argument about the legislature's proscribed from doing that
if the Supreme Court is doing that, as well.

MS. CHAPMAN: Right. I mean -- well, what we're saying is that the legislature exceeded authority under the Victim's Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court adopted, whole cloth -- what the Supreme Court rule says is you can't ask a victim for an interview. So it's a little more limited than what 4433 says. But in both cases, we think it exceeds what the Victim's Bill of Rights proscribes.

THE COURT: What I was referring to is Rule 39, Subsection --

MS. CHAPMAN: (B) (11).

THE COURT: -- (B)(11). It's broader than that. It says, "After charges are filed, defense-initiated request to interview the victim shall be communicated to the

victim through the prosecutor."

MR. CHAPMAN: Right. So that's a request for an interview.

Rule 4433 (B) is slightly broader. It says any contact.

So again, 39(B)(11) is limited to an interview; and 4433(B) is any contact. So it is slightly broader. But in both cases we believe that both provisions are violative of the First Amendment and violative of the Victim's Bill of Rights. And we believe that 4433 was exceeding the legislature's limited authority under the Victim's Bill of Rights.

So the rule is slightly more narrow than 4433(B). And again, we think they are both violative.

I just want to be clear that the Victim's Bill of Rights does say a victim doesn't have to submit to an interview. And right now, for purposes of this motion, we are not quibbling with that.

What we are quibbling with is our ability to approach a victim and conduct outreach. And we described for you what defense based victim outreach is in both Dick Burr's affidavit and elsewhere. And that is what we are being prohibited from doing here. It doesn't address that a victim has all the other rights under the Victim's Bill of Rights, but that is what we are prohibited from doing here.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I just draw your attention to the Constitutional provisions, and it is obviously Article 2.1, Victim's Bill of Rights. Under (A)(5), talks about, quote, "To refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the defendant, the defendant's attorney or other person acting on behalf of the defendant."

And then going down, under No. 11, quote,
"To have all rules governing criminal procedure and the
admissibility of evidence in all criminal proceedings,
protect victim's rights, and to have these rules be subject
to amendment or appeal by the legislature, to ensure the
protection of these rights."

Clearly, I think that the constitutional provision indicates that those rights should be protected, and the legislature should take such steps as are necessary in order to protect them.

MS. CHAPMAN: And I would just direct Your Honor to the citation in our motion to Shumway, which said that to survive constitutional scrutiny, the statutory enactment of the Victim's Bill of Rights must be limited to rights created in the statue, because otherwise it would violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine in the Arizona Constitution, which provides that the Supreme Court enacts Rules of Criminal Procedure.

THE COURT:

Obviously, the first reference is to the Constitution and the Victim's Bill of Rights, particularly. The purpose of the Victim's Bill of Rights to preserve and protect the victim's rights, justice and due process. And they set forth in Subsection (A) the various rights, the first one of which is to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse throughout the criminal justice process.

Thank you.

There are, then, following that general statement some specifics about rights with regard to release or notification upon escape, to be present, and upon request to be informed of all criminal proceedings where the defendant has a right to be present, and to be heard at any proceedings involving post-arrest release decisions, which is where I think the Justice of the Peace fell down in terms of the advice and where apparently there was some misunderstanding, at least as far as my position was concerned with regard to that up until fairly recently, but also to be heard with regard to the negotiated plea and sentencing.

The proscriptions on contact and the Victim's Bill of Rights are not stated in that fashion. They are stated in Subsection 5 as "To refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the defendant, the

defendant's attorney or other person acting on behalf of the defendant," presumably referring to things like investigators. Rights to confer with the prosecution, to read presentence reports, to receive restitution promptly, to be heard at post-conviction proceedings, to a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of the case after conviction and sentencing, and importantly, to be informed of Victim's Constitutional rights.

Mr. Butner is correct that there are some references in Subsection (D) and in Subsection (A)(11), that refer to the subject of amendment or passing of legislation, initiative or referendum to enact the substantive or procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to the victims by this part of the Arizona Constitution.

Then there is something relatively akin to Amendment Ten of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, Subsection (E). The implementation of Victim's Rights was, if I recall correctly, first done through rule of the Supreme Court through the Criminal Procedure Rule 39, and I will grant that that is broad, in the sense that it refers to some restrictions on defense counsel's contact with victims.

I don't find the First Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment violations in that, however. And

frankly, I don't find that the statutory implementation
language violates the Constitution.

So I am going to deny the motion specifically for the Court to declare 13-4431 and/or 4433(B) through (E), and specifically Rule 39(B)(11) as unconstitutional.

Frankly, in this case, the -- to the extent that it has impacted the defendant, and the impact is with reference to the brother and mother and not, in my opinion, with regard to the contacts between the daughters of Mr. DeMocker and Mr. DeMocker's counsel, my observation is, and maybe it is a result of the misadvice that I think they were given at the time of the initial appearance, that they would have to waive all victim's rights. I don't think that the Constitutional provision or the statutes -- which is why I asked that question. I don't think that there is anything in the rules or the statutes or the Victim's Bill of Rights itself that sets forth exactly how a victim opts in or opts out or loses, other than being in custody, their constitutional rights under the Victim's Bill of Rights.

And I think that rather than broadly declaring the statutes unconstitutional, that they can be read in a fashion that upholds their constitutionality, in the way in which the Court has read it, in allowing Mr. Dupont and his clients to have a word with the Court

about the issue of release is appropriate.

I think -- I don't think that -- I do
think this: that the victims have a broad capability of
asserting what rights they wish to assert under the Victim's
Bill of Rights and to waive what rights they wish to waive.
It seems to me their rights, much as the rights of a
defendant, can be waived knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. So can Victim's Bill of Rights rights be
waived, in terms of having contact from a defendant who is
accused in the case, having contact with his or her counsel.
I think that those rights, like other rights, can be waived
and, on the other hand, can be asserted. And it's up to the
victim to assert or to waive.

But I don't find that the statutory implementation, as authorized under the Victim's Bill of Rights itself, represents an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial department prerogatives in connection with making rules for proceedings in the criminal sector.

So for those reasons, I am going to deny the motion to declare those sections or sections of rules unconstitutional.

I have next on the list the defense motion for finding of probable cause on the aggravators, a Chronis hearing.

I have next after that a defense motion

to suppress evidence, a Franks hearing, which I understood 1 2 was meant for tomorrow. 3 Are there other motions that you are 4 interested in having me take up today, such as the defense 5 motion to compel Sprint and Verizon, which is what was filed 6 November 12? 7 We have seen your signed orders on MR. SEARS: 8 both of those motions, Your Honor, and we are getting ready 9 to comply and re-service Sprint and Verizon with that and 10 another copy of the motion. 11 THE COURT: I didn't want, honestly, to wait 12 for the response of the State with regard to that. I think 13 we need to move on that. 14 MR. SEARS: Thank you, Your Honor. Without offense intended. 15 THE COURT: MR. BUTNER: No offense taken, Judge. 16 17 THE COURT: I expected that was the case. 18 was more lack of cooperation from a third party than it was 19 the State's --20 I understand, MR. BUTNER: 21 MR. SEARS: Judge, it's not a motion, but 22 there is one scheduling matter related to our hearing on 23 December 15 dealing with jury issues. When we got you to pry 24 some time loose on your calendar to set that, you squeezed out an hour and a half for us that day. And we were hoping 25

1 that the earth had moved and you had some more time either 2 that day or close thereto, because we have done a 3 considerable amount of work getting ready for that, and we 4 think that all the parties and the Court would benefit from a 5 bit more time to consider the number of issues that we have 6 teed up for discussion. 7 THE COURT: I am not sure about that week. Ι 8 think I have a trial that is currently scheduled to commence the 16th. I guess I don't know if it is going to go or not 9 at this point. I do have, I think, some time available the 10 week before, if you wanted to start on it earlier than the 11 12 15th. 13 MR. SEARS: Sure. 14 THE COURT: The --I know I am out of state. 15 MR. SEARS: 16

be back the 9th. I am going that Monday and Tuesday, which I think is the 7th and 8th.

THE COURT: I think Wednesday the 9th I have time available, if you are able to do that.

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. SEARS: I'm sure I have.

Mr. Butner, are there other issues THE COURT: that you wanted to discuss today, other than maybe some general discussion, and I don't know if you need to have that in open court or if you wanted to -- you and Mr. Sears and Mr. Hammond wanted to discuss the Chronis hearing at this

1 point, as distinguished from on Thursday? 2 MR. BUTNER: I don't have any other issues to 3 discuss, Judge. I am not sure I even want to discuss the 4 Chronis hearing anywhere else. But if compelled, of course, 5 I will be there. 6 MR. SEARS: We ask for an order compelling 7 Mr. Butner's attendance, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Anything else that you think I 9 needed to take up before the 15th or before the 9th or before 10 tomorrow? We have an e-mail from Deb from 11 MR. SEARS: 12 here, who says that they contacted -- she contacted Sorenson, 13 whose response is -- Sorenson is saying this: "We charge 14 \$250 per hour. This request should be under two hours; 15 therefore, the cost should not be more than \$500." 16 THE COURT: That's gracious of them. 17 MR. SEARS: "Let me know if you need 18 additional help with this." 19 So that is the current state of where we 20 are with Sorenson Lab. 21 I think this relates to the protocols; 22 right? 23 It was not only the protocols MS. CHAPMAN: 24 but the other eight items on the original list. MR. SEARS: All the other things we asked for 25

1 that we are still waiting to hear. 2 THE COURT: I would like some better 3 explanation from them about what exactly they think we are 4 getting for the \$500 -- "we" in the grand sense. 5 MR. SEARS: That would about cover a plane 6 ticket for Mr. Butner to fly to Salt Lake and pick it up 7 himself and come right back. 8 MR. BUTNER: Bring it back. 9 THE COURT: I could be persuaded to do that 10 myself. 11 I could, your Honor, if they have MR. BUTNER: 12 enough snow in the Wasatches. 13 MR. SEARS: During ski season. 14 MR. BUTNER: That's right. 15 THE COURT: Well, I still would like to know 16 what --17 MR. BUTNER: We will inquire, Judge, 18 absolutely. 19 THE COURT: -- what they're asking that much 20 money for, if it's simply a downloading process onto a disk 21 or even somebody standing at a Xerox machine making copies. 22 If you would please inquire. 23 Anything else today, then, Mr. Sears? 24 MR. SEARS: I don't believe -- if we could

have some time with you in chambers, we waive

25

1 Mr. DeMocker's presence so the jail can take him back. 2 THE COURT: We can do that. So I will 3 adjourn, then, at this point. If you need to clean up the desk and check availability for November then let me know. 4 Ι 5 will try to find out what is still available on November 9. 6 I think pretty much maybe the whole day is -- maybe a couple 7 of little hearings set. MR. SEARS: Maybe December 9? 8 Thank you. December 9. THE COURT: And see 9 10 if I can plug you in to some more time there. MR. SEARS: And nine o'clock in the morning to 11 12 resume tomorrow? 13 THE COURT: The nine o'clock is to resume, 14 then, the Franks issues. 15 Suppression and Franks. MR. SEARS: THE COURT: Okay. We will take a recess and 16 17 go off record. You don't need our discussions on record, 18 19 or do you? 20 I'm afraid I think we do need to MR. SEARS: 21 have them on the record. Then I will have the court 22 THE COURT: 23 reporter and court clerk in chambers, also. I'll just leave 24 things here for now.

25

MR. BUTNER: Judge, before we go off record, I

7

5

6

9

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

22

24

23

25

grabbed my calendar to see if I -- because it struck me that December 9 is a bad day for Joe, and it is at -- at this moment, I have a trial that is scheduled to start that day. But I had been given some information that maybe that trial was not going to go, by defense counsel. That was going to be resolved in my absence in court this morning, I think, so I will try to find out.

THE COURT: Make a phone call. ten-minute recess or so, and I'll let you all take a brief rest here.

(Brief recess.)

We are on the record, but THE COURT: Mr. DeMocker has left, as everyone except the three lawyers for the defense team and Mr. Butner and his paralegal and my staff.

Mr. Sears.

MR. SEARS: Judge, of course, we waive Mr. DeMocker's presence, for the record, here, as we said we would.

As we get ready to move forward here on Thursday with our expert witness, we were hoping to have a minute to chat with and you Mr. Butner about the state of the Chronis issues at this point. We are not proposing that we arque these motions or do much. Just see if there was something we could talk about that might give everyone

concerned a little more quidance and direction about where we 2 were going. 3 One of the things we did in the last day 4 or so was to pull out a few of the cases on F-6 that we 5 talked about and had extra copies made. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. SEARS: And I have them. 8 It's State vs. Murdaugh, M-u-r-d-a-u-g-h, 9 that we talked about 10 State vs. Newell, N-e-w-e-l-1, an Arizona 11 Supreme Court case. 12 Gretzler, a 1983 Supreme Court case. 13 And Anderson, a 2005 Arizona Supreme 14 Court case. 15 And I have copies for the Court and 16 Mr. Butner, because I think these are the cases, particularly 17 Murdaugh and Anderson, that we have talked about a great 18 deal, and I expect when we get around to the end of the 19 Chronis hearing and some sort of argument, we will talk about 20 them some more. 21 THE COURT: The State's memorandum didn't give 22 me any indication that they were going to withdraw No. 6 or 23 necessarily any of the other ones. 24 Is that a right read, Mr. Butner? 25 MR. BUTNER: That's a right read, Judge.

you also probably took note that we did not vigorously argue a couple of those. Right. So I am sure that the Court will make a judicious decision.

MR. SEARS: And that's better than nothing.

As Judge Kiger says, it's more than a little and less than a lot.

Because I was kind of hoping it has something to do with how we would use our time on Thursday. And particularly, we are bringing up Mr. Curry, who is our forensic financial expert, to talk in detail about his work and also his assessment of the work and testimony of Mr. Echols in this case. And to the extent that the State is -- I don't know how to put this gently -- if the State is not vigorously pursuing the -- what we call the witness-killing aggravator, Mr. Curry would otherwise be prepared --

THE COURT: No. 12.

MR. SEARS: That's right.

Mr. Curry would be prepared to testify at length about his analysis of the e-mails, Exhibit 138, and other materials that he has been provided to talk about that.

If we knew that the State was just going to rest on what is presented so far and we had some indication from the Court where we were heading, we might be able to foreshorten that part of Mr. Curry's testimony

1 greatly. 2 THE COURT: So without deciding it, I will 3 tell you I have -- I am having real trouble with F-12 and F-13. I am kind of open-minded on the rest. 4 5 F-2, to some extent, has had a grand jury 6 determination, and maybe that is still there. 7 The pecuniary gain, I've already 8 expressed some opinions about that, and at a certain point in 9 time recognizing the difference between the Simpson hearing 10 and a Chronis hearing. And the F-6 has had some clarification. 11 12 I guess I hear what you are saying, but I am not sure that I 13 am there, yet, Mr. Sears. 14 MR. SEARS: I understand. 15 Is that at all helpful? THE COURT: 16 MR. SEARS: It is. 17 It's more than a little, it's less THE COURT: than a lot. 1.8 It is, yes. Where have I heard 19 MR. SEARS: 20 that? I don't know if you were -- we have, of 21 22 course, obtained transcripts, now, of all of the testimony of 23 all of the witnesses, which we would be happy to share back 24 with the Court, if you don't have access to that.

particularly, we now have the benefit of looking at the

25

State's bench memo overnight and have gone back and looked at parts of the record that we can identify. But if you had those transcripts and were going to look at parts of it, I can more easily make reference to them than copying those parts and giving them to you and then facing the inevitable request from Mr. Butner that we give him more than I copied. 'THE COURT: Who has what? Do you both have transcripts of all of the --

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I don't think that we have complete transcripts, and I haven't been able to make sure.

THE COURT: If you want to make references to the transcript, I don't think I have them yet, but Roxanne indicated to me that if I wanted her to make copies for me, that she would simply do that, if you think it is easier to handle it in that way, and just make transcriptional references. I think that is probably the soundest way of doing it.

MR. SEARS: I don't know if we are going to have more than a dozen or so different places that we would want to point you back to what we think the witness has actually said as opposed to what the State said they said.

THE COURT: Is it particularly when you have your guy on that you want me to have access to the transcripts, and Mr. Butner to have access to the transcript,

2 before Thursday? 3 MR. SEARS: I don't think so. I was thinking 4 more in terms of when we get around to arguing this, and 5 presuming that you would consider taking this under 6 advisement for a period of time. And a lot of it has to do 7 with the testimony of Dr. Keen, which has now been sometime 8 ago. And what keyed us to this were some things that were in 9 the State's memo that caused us to go back and look at what 10 we think Dr. Keen said in the transcript. 11 THE COURT: Especially Reference 6? 12 MR. SEARS: That's correct. 13 But there are places in there in which we 14 looked at what Mr. Echols said and also what Deputy Brown 15 said -- Detective Brown -- Deputy Brown said. And there is 16 probably a dozen places, and we may identify more the next 17 day or two as we look more carefully at what the State has 18 said here. 19 THE COURT: I wouldn't mind if you want to do 20 That's fine. Probably helpful. it that way. 21 MR. SEARS: Okay. "That way" being make the 22 references or make the copies? 23 THE COURT: The references, not the copies. 24 The other thing that MR. SEARS: Thank you. 25 occurs to me, because we have had somewhat of an unpleasant

as well, as that point, so I have her make some copies for me

history in this building on this issue is that we are running up against the 60 days, the magic 60 days on our release motion. And the last thing we want to do is put the Court in a position of having to rule before you are ready to rule. And I don't know exactly the best way to do that, but if the Court wanted to -- in the tradition of Judge Greer, order some more briefs or do something to extend the 60 days or something like that or set oral argument on it to get yourself enough time to do what you need to do to consider that, along with these other issues, we are not opposed to

THE COURT: We are coming up on that. I think my 60th day is actually Monday.

MR. SEARS: That was our count.

THE COURT: Because Saturday is the actual

So I, in particular, was -- when I took it under advisement, knew that we were having a Chronis hearing. And a big element in my decision, I think, is if the death penalty is off the table or -- well, that is a major change in the circumstances of the case that might warrant some reconsideration of the issue.

If the death penalty is still on the table, I am not sure that I am going to change where I am now on that, and that is part of -- a major part of what I am

thinking.

MR. SEARS: I guess there is a middle ground, as there always is.

THE COURT: I recognize that there is a middle ground, as well.

MR. SEARS: Just one thought might be to set it for some brief status hearing or something past the 60th day, and I would be willing to agree that that would extend the Court's time to consider the matter, if you are comfortable with that. I don't know that the State would oppose that.

THE COURT: Not especially comfortable with it, Mr. Butner?

MR. BUTNER: Judge, if you need more time, that is fine. I just don't want to do something that is sort of strangely artificial, either.

THE COURT: Yeah. I don't believe in that very much.

MR. SEARS: Judge Abbey used to -- when he was here that year when Mr. Hammond was trying the Spurlock case, and had our judge up there that whole year, Judge Greer calendared everything for 55 days and ordered a new round of hearings every 55 days, and went an entire year without having to rule a single case -- which got him a job on the Court of Appeals. I see that as a cause and effect.

1 THE COURT: That and some political 2 repercussions of the northeastern part of the state at the 3 time. MR. SEARS: And his willingness to bet heavily 5 on his own terrible golf game. 6 THE COURT: May he rest in peace, too. 7 MR. SEARS: That's another one. 8 THE COURT: Let me think about that. And I --9 I don't really want to engage in artificial postponing of 10 decision. But if I think, after listening on Thursday, that 11 I need some additional time, I will get back with you. 12 MR. BUTNER: That would be fine. 13 MR. SEARS: Thank you. We are just putting 14 that out there. 15 Thank you for the thought. THE COURT: 16 We haven't had any mental health 17 evaluations in the case, and to raise a different topic with 18 you. 19 MR. SEARS: None under the rule that would be 20 the subject of litigation at this point. The position in our 21 defense is that Mr. DeMocker was not here to do this. 22 THE COURT: Do you think I need to do an 23 evaluation for a death penalty case to ascertain that the 24 defendant, who seems very competent and intelligent to me, is 25 perfectly within his gourd?

MR. SEARS: I would be real careful here,

Judge, because I did the direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme

Court in the <u>Kayer</u> case, and there was an unfortunate

discussion on the record in <u>Kayer</u> by the Court and counsel

about how they all thought that Mr. Kayer was competent and

filing things.

THE COURT: Well, that's why I'm asking.

MR. SEARS: I took a very different view when I did the appeal and cited on the record some things that Mr. Kayer said and did that I thought were contrary with that.

Without expressing any opinion on our client's competence at this point, I can say that we do not contemplate bringing any proceeding under any of the mental health rules for evaluation of our client, at this time, nor do we think it's necessary at this point for the Court to order something like that sua sponte.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I think that that's something that we have to do now. Just a more or less -- like a screening, so to speak. I think that -- I haven't dealt with this in a while, and I am asking the paralegal to find that statute. I don't see any reason -- don't misunderstand me, I don't see any Rule 11 type reason for an examination of the defendant, but I just think we have to do

1 | that.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, I don't think Rule 11 or any other rule contemplates giving that option to the State or even to the court sua sponte, unless there was indication from something that this was an issue in the case.

I understand what Mr. Butner may be suggesting is the State's concern, that if this case resulted in conviction, this would be an argument that some post-conviction relief counsel could make. But we have an obligation to our client in this case. And because of the reciprocal nature of these examinations, of the disclosure of the State, decisions about this are not lightly entered into by defense counsel in capital cases, and I can tell you that that's the way that we approach this.

THE COURT: You are a very experienced capital case attorney. Are you aware -- as is Mr. Hammond -- are you aware of any requirements, case law, or rule in capital cases that contemplates an evaluation be done in each and every case?

MR. SEARS: Oh, no.

THE COURT: And I know we are cart before the horse, because the Chronis hearing isn't over, but I wanted to raise the issue.

MR. HAMMOND: I am relatively certain that there is no requirement as a matter of capital litigation.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20

21

22

23 24

25

And having just done a couple of Rule 11 cases in the non-capital area, but serious homicides, my experience is that if there were a basis established -- and in fact, if there was a basis, we would have an obligation, I think, to bring it to the Court's attention, along with the State.

I think it's not too much to say that we are doing our own internal assessment, as part of what we think is our obligation as capital defense lawyers. But at this point, in terms of the Rule 11 factors, his ability to comprehend the issues and cooperate with his defense -- if you would just release him, we could demonstrate to you how cooperative he could be. I think it would be premature and without foundation at this time.

THE COURT: In the sense that I haven't made any ruling with regard to Chronis, I acknowledge it's premature, but it is something I would like you to take a look at and think about and make sure that we are not traipsing down any bad road by not ordering it, based on my observations of him being apparently competent in everything and in every way that I have observed in the courtroom. I don't deal with him as you do with communications, and he has not taken the stand, and not required to in any of the proceedings, of course. But I just wanted to float that one by you and make sure that I am in good standing with the appeals courts.

MR. SEARS: Let me just amplify for a second that as the three of us having all done capital cases in other jurisdictions in Arizona, we all understand the ABA guidelines and the U.S. Supreme Court cases circumscribe a whole range of responsibilities and obligations. We haven't talked about some of them today, about out of reach and things like that.

But without question, the issue of your own client's mental health, both currently his ability to assist or to not assist, and his state of mind at the time of the alleged offense, are things which are always in our mind, as they should be, and are always the subject of different kinds of evaluation and investigation. And Larry is correct that if we had reason to believe that one or the other or both of those circumstances were at issue, we would be duty-bound to bring those issues to the Court's attention. I can tell you that I am in a habeas corpus proceeding in Federal Court in a capital case, and that was one of the allegations, was that there was insufficient investigation done about the defendant's mental health. So I know where that leads.

THE COURT: Anything else on that issue,

Mr. Butner?

MR. BUTNER: No.

THE COURT: If you find something along those

1 lines that puts some burden on us -- me -- I will order that. 2 Judge, it's just out of an MR. BUTNER: 3 abundance of caution. The death penalty cases that I have 4 had lately, there's just been that initial screening. 5 just been automatic, so to speak. Like okay, fine. And I 6 understand why counsel don't want to put their client through 7 that, and I have no questions in my mind about Mr. DeMocker. Okay? But it is what it is, as they say. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sears, other issues you 10 wanted to take up? 11 No. I think my -- oh, Mr. Butner MR. SEARS: 12 was going to make a call and see if he was available on December 9. 13 14 MR. BUTNER: I made it, and I am. 15 THE COURT: You are available? 16 MR. BUTNER: Yes. 17 THE COURT: Good. I suppose I ought to put Judge Hess's bench back together, again. See you tomorrow at 18 9:00. 19 20 Right. So do we - So the 9th, MR. SEARS: 21 some amount of time on the 9th and also on the 15th? 22 THE COURT: Yeah. I will print out what I 23 have tomorrow and then plug you in someplace on the 9th. 24 you can bring calendars so we can compare notes about if the 25 morning or afternoon is better or how much time.

1 MR. SEARS: We were in the process of 2 preparing an Omnibus Motion that will bring in a lot of 3 different issues, and we think that we would file it, and it 4 would otherwise be ready for hearing before the January 5 hearing dates. And I don't know whether the Court -- I don't 6 know if you are going to work, for example, between Christmas 7 and New Year's. 8 THE COURT: Hoping not to. 9 MR. SEARS: Okay. That makes several of us. 10 MR. HAMMOND: I actually think it's probably 11 better for us. We are all in midstream on this one. 12 Obviously, the Omnibus Motion is to us a very important one. 13 And we have -- we are doing some 14 statistical work that I think should have been done in 15 Arizona a long time ago, but I think it probably -- just in 16 terms of what we have learned in the last couple of days, I 17 think having that in January will probably --18 THE COURT: Make more sense? 19 MR. HAMMOND: Probably. It is not something 20 that will be easily consumed in one bite, but I do think we are probably just as wise to --21 22 MR. BUTNER: I was looking forward to a Christmas present. 23 24 MR. HAMMOND: Well, you may have it.

25

MR. BUTNER: You see I am being sarcastic, I

1 hope. 2 Tonque is firmly planted in cheek. THE COURT: 3 MR. HAMMOND: Judge, before we leave, I don't 4 want to belabor the Chronis thing, but one thing that I think 5 is bothering us is the pecuniary gain part of this. reason it troubles us as much as it does is that this just 6 7 doesn't feel like a pecuniary gain case. MR. BUTNER: I just really thought we weren't 8 9 going to argue this today or any of these, Mr. Hammond. on. I am sure it doesn't feel good to you. 10 I don't want it to feel good. MR. HAMMOND: 11 want it to feel like something I've felt before, and this 12 doesn't feel like anything -- well, if this is trenching on 13 the time of the Court and Mr. Butner, then I will shut up, 14 but I --15 16 MR. BUTNER: Well, nobody cares about my time. 17 And you don't, and I know that. But I do care about the argument thing. I mean, you know, that is always the 18 19 problem. Go back to the office, then, and 20 THE COURT: 21 get their list of stuff. I put my call in. You know? We 22 MR. BUTNER: got the wheels of justice, so to speak, are turning, I hope. 23 24 THE COURT: Okay. I will hold my fire.

MR. HAMMOND:

25

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. BUTNER: Thank you, sir. 3 THE COURT: Your guy on Thursday mainly has to 4 do with the pecuniary gain issue and Mr. Echols, I believe. 5 MR. SEARS: And witness killing. 6 THE COURT: But has to do with --7 MR. SEARS: He is a financial -- he is a CPA and financial forensics expert. And so he has many, if not 8 9 all of the same credentials as Mr. Echols has. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Echols took all of the day, I 11 think. Are we likely to go into Friday? 12 I don't know. I don't think my MR. SEARS: 13 direct examination -- I am doing my best to focus the direct 14 examination in the nature of rebuttal. That is why I am 15 really looking at what he is testifying -- for the most part 16 is rebuttal, without bringing in new information, except to 17 the extent that he can describe the independent work that he 18 has done to look at some of the issues that Mr. Echols and 19 the State has raised about Mr. DeMocker's finances and 20 Mr. DeMocker's conduct in the divorce case and with respect 21 to his tax returns. 22 I was trying to figure out what THE COURT: 23 the rest of the week holds in store, but I guess I will wait 24 to see whether we are going to have hearings also on Friday.

MR. SEARS: I don't think there is any benefit

25

to anybody in having Mr. Curry, our witness, just plow the same field. I think he has -- we have provided the State with a report that he has done that he attempted to focus on his observations about the same things that Mr. Echols was looking at, and also about what Mr. Echols said about those things. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I will see you in the morning, nine o'clock. MR. SEARS: Thank you. (Whereupon, these proceedings were concluded.) ***000***

CERTIFICATE

I, ROXANNE E. TARN, CR, a Certified Reporter in the State of Arizona, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages 1 - 156 constitute a full, true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings had in the foregoing matter, all done to the best of my skill and ability.

SIGNED and dated this 7th day of January, 2010.

ROXANNE E. TARN, CR Certified Reporter Certificate No. 50808